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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the billing policies followed by the
Department of Defense (DoD) in recovering costs incurred from
providing services to private enterprises. Examples studied include
DoD assistance provided to the Paramount Pictures Corporation in
the production of the motion pictures Top Gun and The Hunt for Red
October, as well as to the Exxon Corporation for assistance provided
in the Exxon Valdez oil-spill cleanup.
Although the purposes for the assistance provided in each case
were unique, the types of resources used (i.e., ships, aircraft, and
personnel) were the same. Due to differences in DoD billing policies,
DoD did not seek the same reimbursements from both corporations.
For example, DoD required reimbursements from Exxon for all
military personnel costs incurred in the Exxon Valdez case, but not
from Paramount Pictures for similar costs in The Hunt for Red
October production. Inconsistencies were also found in the imple-
mentation of the various policies by the DoD Components involved.
If uniformity and consistency in billing procedures are to be at-
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There are numerous sources of policy guidance and detailed
billing procedures available that cover transactions in which the
Government purchases or contracts for services and material from
private organizations. However, these same sources provide little
guidance, if any, for billing procedures to follow during those
instances in which the provider of services is the government and
the recipient is a private, nondefense enterprise.
This thesis involves an examination of the policies and billing
practices followed by DoD, with particular emphasis on the United
States Navy, when providing services to
1. The Paramount Pictures Corporation for the filming of the
motion pictures Top Gun and The Hunt for Red October and
2. The Exxon Corporation in support of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
cleanup operation.
The Chief of Information (CHINFO) and the Navy Office of
Information, West (NAVINFO West) are the principal overseers of
DoD involvements with the entertainment industry. These two or-
ganizations implement the policies and guidances mandated in the
two principle DoD instructions (DODINST) which provide specific
policies for assisting non-government agencies in commercial
productions. NAVINFO West receives from 200 to 250 script
proposals each year and selects, on average, one per year to receive
DoD production assistance. Once a script is chosen, NAVINFO West
serves as liaison with the production company, coordinating
services to be provided, as well as billing procedures to be followed
by all DoD components participating.
With respect to the Exxon Valdez cleanup, The Clean Water Act
and The National Contingency Plan are the principal policy
statements which authorize and prescribe this type of Federal
Government response to a major oil spill. These guidelines de-
signate the United States Coast Guard as the agency responsible for
overseeing such operations, including implementation of procedures
for the reimbursement of costs incurred by federal agencies
participating in the cleanup effort.
B. THESIS SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
This thesis involves an analysis of the policies governing the
billing procedures used in recovering the costs incurred in providing
services to these two private organizations. This includes an exam-
ination of the differences in billing procedures which resulted
under each of the applicable policies.
The thesis includes an assessment of the two DoD instructions
governing the assistance provided in the two motion picture pro-
ductions. DODINST 5410.16, dated January 21, 1964, was revised
and implemented on January 26, 1988 after the filming of Top Gun,
but before negotiations began for The Hunt for Red October. The
billing procedures used in the two productions are compared in order
to identify changes that took place following the DoD policy
revision. These billing procedures are, in turn, compared with those
followed in the Exxon Valdez case in order to determine what
similarities and dissimilarities exist in deriving the charges asses-
sed to each private corporation. Although other Services were
involved in the three undertakings, this thesis focuses mainly on the
policies and billing procedures followed by the United States Navy.
The General Accounting Office has also conducted audits which
examine DoD assistance provided to both motion picture and tele-
vision producers (focusing specifically on the Top Gun production)
and to Exxon in the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation. The
findings and recommendations presented in the audits are reviewed.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The analysis performed for this thesis was based upon a
combination of archival and empirical research. This included exam-
ination of billing documentation provided by CINCPACFLT, NAVINFO
West, and CHINFO, as well as information obtained through telephone
interviews with personnel from the Comptroller and Public Affairs
Offices of the numerous DoD commands involved in each exercise.
The Department of Defense was the primary source of information,
since both the Paramount Pictures and Exxon Corporations con-
sidered the subjects confidential and turned down the author's
request for any information concerning billing practices. The Office
of the Comptroller of the Navy, as well as the CINCPACFLT
Comptroller's Office, maintained detailed records for all three
4-
cases. This enabled the author to obtain an accurate description of
billing practices followed, despite the limitations created by the
two corporations' reluctance to provide pertinent records.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis has seven chapters.
Chapter I includes introductory and background information and
provides the reader with the objectives and scope of the thesis.
Chapter II provides a detailed examination of the DoD billing
policy govering the assistance provided to Paramount Pictures in the
production of the motion picture Top Gun. This includes a review of
the costs incurred and the billing procedures followed by the United
States Navy in providing this type of assistance.
Chapter III reviews changes made in DoD policy, after the Top
Gun production, governing services provided to the entertainment
industry. This includes an examination of the additional billing
guidance provided, as well as the changes in reimbursement criteria,
which were implemented through revision of DODINST 5410.16.
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Chapter IV presents a detailed examination of the DoD billing
policy govering the assistance provided to Paramount Pictures in the
production of the motion picture The Hunt for Red October. This
includes a review of the costs incurred and the billing procedures
followed by the U.S. Navy in providing this type of assistance.
Chapter V describes the Federal Government's involvement in
the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation, and the procedures
followed in determining the costs to assess the Exxon Corporation
for assistance provided. Also included is an examination of the
reimbursement process administered by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Chapter VI provides a comparison of the policies and billing
procedures followed in each of the three cases. This includes an
examination of the dissimilarities in policy regarding charges
assessed to each of the private parties, as well as the
inconsistencies found in policy implementation. Possible justifi-
cations for the differences in policy are discussed.
Chapter VII summarizes the conclusions, based on the analysis
presented in Chapter VI, and then provides recommendations for
possible improvements and suggests topics for further research.
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II. DOD INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE
MOTION PICTURE TOP GUN
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the procedures followed by the United
States Navy in determining the costs to assess the Paramount
Pictures Corporation for assistance provided in the filming of the
motion picture Top Gun.
Offered first is a brief explanation of the Navy's involvement
with Paramount Pictures, as well as the Department of Defense
(DoD) policies governing this type of assistance to private organ-
izations. This is followed by a detailed examination of the various
components of costs involved and the procedures used to derive the
charges assessed for DoD support in this production.
B. BACKGROUND
United States Navy involvement with Paramount Pictures in the
filming of Top Gun began in October 1984 when producers Donald
Simpson and Jerald Bruckheiner presented the Navy Office of
-7
Information West (NAVINFO West) with the initial script proposal.
The final screenplay was approved by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) and filming began in late June
1985. NAVINFO West served as project coordinator and assigned a
project officer to the Top Gun production. This project officer
coordinated Navy assets in San Diego, CA, Fallon, NV, and on four
aircraft carriers (three at sea) for filming which continued inter-
mittently through November 1985. (NAVINFO West, August 4, 1986)
As directed by Chief of Information, Washington D.C. (CHINFO),
NAVINFO West coordinated billings for all Navy commands through
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) Comptroller.
(CHINFO, 281 721 Z JUN 85)
For production assistance provided by the United States Navy,
the Paramount Pictures Corporation paid reimbursements in the
amount of $1,241,902.48 (NAVINFO West, March 1, 1988). The motion
picture Top Gun opened in theaters across the United States on May
16, 1986 and by January 6, 1988 had accumulated a total gross of
$171,626,614.00 (Hollywood Reporter, January 6, 1988, p. 59).
-8-
The following is an analysis of the policy and cost accounting
procedures observed by the United States Navy in providing this
atypical assistance to Paramount Pictures.
C. DOD BILLING AND COST ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
Department of Defenses Instruction (DODINST) 5410.16 dated
January 21,1964, DODINST 5410.15 dated November 3, 1966, and the
Navy Comptroller Manual (NAVCOMPT) were the main sources of
policy in effect during the time DoD was involved in the Top Gun
production. DODINST 5410.16, Procedures for DoD Assistance on
Production of Non-Government Motion Pictures and Television
Programs, stipulates that commitment of DoD assistance can only be
made after the ASD(PA) has reviewed and evaluated the script, and
only after a detailed list of the production company's envisioned
requirements for DoD assistance is prepared. DoD cost estimates
and billing procedures are based upon this list of requirements. Even
with these general prerequisites, the military services, in effect,
provide assistance for movie and television productions without
either a written agreement specifying the assistance to be provided
or the terms of reimbursement for that assistance. (Inspector
General, 1986)
DODINST 5410.16 also authorizes the military services to
assign project officers who are responsible for maintaining liaison
with the production company, the ASD(PA), and the various services
that provide assistance. The only reference to costs reimbursements
found in the instruction pertains to expenses attributed to the
services of the project officer. It states:
Assignment will be at no additional costs to the Government.
The producing company will assume the payment of such items
as travel and room and board. (DODINST 5410.16, Incl. 2)
The instruction further mandates that the project officer is to
submit weekly reports which will include an accounting of expenses,
but it offers no guidance on how to establish the amount of expenses
incurred by the Government (DODINST 5410.16, Inclosure 2).
DODINST 5410.16 implements authority contained in DODINST
5410.15 of January 21, 1964, which was updated and replaced on
November 3, 1966. Both the old and revised instructions are entitled
Delineation of DoD Audio-Visual Public Affairs Responsibilities and
Policies. The revised instruction provides additional guidance as to
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DoD policy regarding what actual assistance requires reimburse-
ment. Section V, paragraph E of this instruction states:
Diversion of equipment, personnel, and material resources
from normal military locations or military operations may be
authorized only when circumstances preclude filming without
it, and such diversions shall be held to a minimum and without
interference with military operations, and will be on the basis
that the production company will reimburse the Government
for expenses incurred in the diversion (DODINST 5410.15,
November 3, 1966).
However, DODINST 5410.15 does not define "diversion" nor does
it provide examples to guide billing activities. According to the DoD
Inspector General audit report, billing practices are not standard-
ized because DoD policies on billing have not been clearly defined.
(Inspector General, 1986)
The DoD Instructions briefly described above, along with the
NAVCOMPT Manual, were the main sources of guidance in effect in
October, 1985 when Paramount Pictures first requested DoD assis-
tance in the production of the motion picture Top Gun. In accordance
with this guidance, the Chief of Information (CHINFO) informed all
commands providing assistance in the Top Gun production that
U.S. Government expense incurred by diversion of equip-
ment, personnel, and material resources from normal military
-11-
locations or military operations as a result of authorized
assistance to motion picture producers must be reimbursed by
the production company. (CHINFO 281721Z JUN 85)
CHINFO instructed all participating commands "...to document
all, repeat all, expenses incurred during production assistance...."
This included all direct and indirect costs such as civilian labor,
military personnel services, costs of material and supplies, travel
expenses, utilities, maintenance of property and equipment, asset
use and administrative charges. (CHINFO 281 721 Z JUN 85, p. 2)
To collect these reimbursements and to ensure the accurate
accounting for payments for material and services furnished, the
NAVCOMPT Manual prescribes three available methods: (Volume 3,
paragraphs 032102 and 032109)
1. Collection of charges as fees in advance of rendering
services or material, if practical.
2. Use of accounts receivable collection procedures when multi-
ple requests for services are received on a continuous basis.
3. The use of an irrevocable letter of credit or surety payment
bond in lieu of an advance deposit.
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Due to the late receipt of Paramount Picture's production
requirements, the U.S. Navy waived normal requirements that Navy
commands provide advance estimates of charges for assistance
requested (CHINFO 281721Z JUN 85 p. 2). CHINFO judged option 3 to
be the most viable method for billing and on August 14, 1985
Paramount authorized the issue of an irrevocable letter of credit
through the NCNB International Bank in New York, a subsidiary of the
NCNB National Bank of North Carolina. (CINCPACFLT, July 19 1985)
The letter of credit number 33035 was in the amount of $1.5
million and was valid through December 31, 1985. The Paramount
Pictures Corporation was designated as payee, with Commander in
Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Fleet Comptroller Office, named as
beneficiary. The terms of the letter specified that Paramount would
make payments within ten business days of receipt of a properly
screened invoice from the CINCPACFLT Comptroller. If payments
were not received within this time frame, the Department of the
Navy was authorized to draw against the letter of credit. (Wattles,
July 15, 1985, p. 1)
13-
The Department of the Navy requested a minimum of two months
to prepare and present a final invoice following the conclusion of
the use of Navy facilities and services. The irrevocable letter of
credit would remain in effect until at least twenty days had elapsed
from presentation of the final invoice. Both parties agreed that the
letter of credit could be amended to extend its duration if necessary
to meet the foregoing requirements. (Wattles, July 15, 1985, p. 1)
Although the NAVCOMPT Manual provides detailed procedures for
collecting reimbursements, the same level of guidance could not be
found concerning requirements for "hold harmless" or indem-
nification agreements. In fact, a review of Navy regulations and DoD
instructions in effect at the time of the Top Gun production failed to
disclose any requirements for this type of insurance agreement.
Nevertheless, Paramount Pictures issued an indemnification agree-
ment on February 11, 1986 which expressly agreed to
...indemnify the United States up to an amount not to exceed
twenty-five million dollars for any damage to property of the
United States or others, or for personal injury (including
death) to any person or persons proximately caused by the
fault or negligence of Paramount, its agents, employees, or
subcontractors ... (Wattles, February 11, 1986)
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DoD policy does not provide guidance for indemnification agree-
ments governing situations where Government equipment is lost or
damaged by Government personnel during its use in a production
(Inspector General, 1986, p. 10). The Top Gun indemnification agree-
ment restricted Paramount's liability to damage or injuries caused
only by its own negligence. Two situations occurred during the
filming of Top Gun that drew attention to the narrow scope of this
agreement. In September 1985, a Navy radio valued at $18,700 was
lost in the ocean by Navy personnel during the filming of an at sea
rescue scene. Paramount refused to pay for the lost radio because
the loss was not due to its own negligence. The second situation
involved damage to an F-14A Tomcat as a result of modifications
made by the Navy at the producer's request. The Tomcat was
temporarily non-operational as a result of electrical problems
caused by the installation of five cameras which were used to film
Top Gun flying scenes. Although Paramount paid for the modifi-
cations, it was reluctant to reimburse the Navy for the costs of the
required repairs. The production company did eventually agree to
pay for these expenses. (Inspector General, 1986, p. 11)
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Once the letter of credit and the indemnification agreement had
been issued, CINCPACFLT tasked COMNAVAIRPAC (Commander Naval
Air Force, Pacific) to act as its purchasing services coordinator.
COMNAVAIRPAC in turn designated COMFITAEWWINGPAC (Commander
Fighter Airborne Early Warning Wing, Pacific) as overall production
coordinator and cost collection agent for AIRPAC commands. All
other activities incurring costs for production reported directly to
CINCPACFLT (COMNAVAIRPAC 011258Z, JUL 85).
With weekly status reports due to CINCPACFLT no later than the
Wednesday following the week reported, COMFITAEWWINGPAC
established its own weekly reporting schedule. Based on Paramount's
work week of Sunday through Saturday, reports from participating
commands were due by the close of business each Monday following
the week reported. COMFITAEWWINGPAC required these reports to
be in the following format: (COMFITAEWWINGPAC, 192000Z JUL 85)
1. Steaming Hours (Ship type/Hull Number/Steaming Hours/Date)
Example: CV/63/3 Plus 40/30 Jun 85
2. Flying Hours (Type of Aircraft/Model/ParentCommand/Flight
Hours/Date) Example: F14A/VF-1/1.2/30 Jun 85
-16-
3. Military/Civilian Personnel Charges (Rate-Rank/Parent Com-
mand/Service Performed/Time in Minutes/Cost/Date)
Example: E-4/VF-1/lnstall RH Brake/90 Mins/$21 .55/5 Jul 85
4. Special Charges (Type of Service or Equipment/Hours of Oper-
ation/ Parent Command/Cost, including surcharges/Date)
Example: JG75 Tractor/5 Plus 30/NAS Miramar/$350/5 Jul 85
5. Brief narrative of how the costs were incurred
6. Unit action officer with phone number
The following is an explanation of the DoD guidance provided and
the methodology used to determine the costs for each of the cost
categories.
1. Steaming Hours
Charges for ship's operations were based on an eighteen
hour day as prescribed in the Navy Program Factors Manual (NPFM).
Commands were instructed to report only those hours, including
whole minutes, in which the ships were deployed specifically for
the purpose of providing production assistance to Paramount
Pictures (COMFITAEWWINGPAC, 192000Z JUL 85, p. 2, para 2A).
NAVINFO West stated that hourly rates for ship operations were not
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developed, since no deployment time was directly attributable to
the Top Gun Production (Sherman, NAVINFO West, March 21, 1991).
2. Flight Hours
Two issues were raised when NAVINFO West requested
guidance in charging Paramount Pictures for the use of Navy aircraft
and related equipment. First, the Navy did not have established
flight hour rates for the various aircraft Paramount Pictures had re-
quested to use in the production. Second, the Department of Defense
had no established or published operating cost data for pricing
aircraft support and services provided to foreign governments and
private parties. The Navy Comptroller's Office proposed that
standard, annually updated, hourly rates be issued by The Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the various military departments.
Proposed rates would include the charges to assess private parties
and foreign governments for the use of fixed wing aircraft services.
Under this approach, significant differences in rates between
departments or within the same department could be avoided. OSD
advised that the Services should jointly undertake the development
of these reimbursable rates. (Navy Accounting and Finance
18
Memorandum, March 12, 1985) To date, DoD still relies on the
individual military branches to develop their own standard flight
hour rates (Strub, OASD(PA), February 21, 1991).
The Office of the Navy Comptroller developed charges spe-
cifically to assess Paramount Pictures for each of the various
aircraft used in Top Gun. These rates were based on information
from the most current Navy Program Factors Manual and cost data
provided by COMNAVAIRPAC. These rates included charges not only
for officer and enlisted personnel services, such as piloting and
maintenance, but also charges for replenishment spares, squadron
annual TAD, engine overhauls, and indirect costs for logistics, base
operations, recruiting, and training. (COMNAVAIRPAC, 011258Z JUL
85, p. 2) The military personnel cost component was derived by
using current Navy Composite Standard Military Rates. Further
explanation of this cost accounting procedure is provided in section
C, which addresses military and civilian personnel costs.
Commands providing assistance itemized and reported each
flight hour as either a sortie dedicated to the motion picture
production (requiring reimbursement) or as a military training mis-
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sion. No sorties were split between production assistance and
training (COMNAVAIRPAC, 011258Z JUL 85, p. 2, para 2B). Table 1-1
provides the flight hour rates established for the aircraft
Paramount Pictures originally considered using in the production
(Boydston, March 6, 1987).
Table 1-1















In its 1986 Report on the Audit of Assistance to Movie and
Television Producers, the DoD Inspector General reported that
Neither DoD instructions nor Army and Navy implementing
regulations discuss the pricing of flying hours. ..Prices charged
for the same types of aircraft varied by as much as $2,380 per
flying hour. (Inspector General, 1986)
Several illustrations of these variations were provided in the re-
port. For example, CINCPACFLT billed Paramount Pictures $2,274.43
per hour for the A-4 aircraft used in the Top Gun production in
September 1985. In contrast, in October 1984 the United States
Marine Corps billed the producer of the television miniseries Space
only $820 per hour for the same type aircraft - a difference of
$1,454.43. The Marine Corps Public Affairs Office in Los Angeles
told the Inspector General's Office that this was the rate used to
bill DoD users for the A-4 aircraft. (Inspector General, 1986, p. 8)
In December 1985, CINCPACFLT billed the producer of Top Gun at
the non-government rate of $2527.00 per flying hour for the UH-1
helicopter (Boydston, March 6, 1987). In October 1985, the Army
Finance and Accounting Office at Fort Rucker, Alabama, billed the
producer of Time to Triumph $147.00 - a difference of $2,380.
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(Inspector General, 1986, p. 9) These examples are presented to
emphasize the lack of standardization among the Services and does
not attempt to propose which rates are correct.
The methods which were followed to reimburse individual
appropriations for flight hours assessed were dependent upon the
particular type of aircraft used and the funding/management chain
of command of the activity providing the aircraft. As examples, the
percentage distributions among appropriation categories for the
F-14A and the FA-18 are presented in Table 1-2 (Navy Accounting




Appropriation # Title Dollar Amount
7,173.56
% of Total
1751804. 702A OM&N 94.39
1751453.2201 MPN Officer 106.46 1.40
1751453.2202 MPN Enlisted 306.30 4.03
172499.00 Fees and Charges
for Miscellaneous
Services 13.68 0.18











Appropriation # Title Dollar Amount % of Total
1751804. 702E OM&N





173041.1201 Asset Use Charge
173041.1201 Admin Surcharge
Reimbursable Rate Per Flying Hour:
A total of nine types of Naval aircraft were required in the
production. The Navy charged Paramount Pictures $998,502.90 for
the 188.9 flight hours flown. (Boydston, March 6, 1987)
3. Personnel Costs
a. Military Personnel Costs
Hourly rates for military personnel were determined by
using the Navy Composite Standard Military Rates (CSMR) as
prescribed in NAVCOMPT Manual 035750 AND NAVCOMPTNOTE 7041,
dated March 7, 1985 (COMNAVAIRPAC 011258Z, JUL 85). A CSMR is
separately computed for each pay grade in each of the military
services. These rates are based on an established 40-hour work
week, and 52 weeks, 260 days, or 2080 hours per year and provide
-23-
for those costs covered under the MPN appropriation (NAVCOMPT
Manual 035750, para 1). These include basic pay, incentive pay,
certain expenses and allowances, and special pay. Miscellaneous
expenses and allowances are computed separately for officer and
enlisted personnel and include items such as subsistence, uniform,
and clothing allowances. Special pay refers to pay bonuses such as
aircrew and submarine bonuses, hazardous duty, and special pay for
physicians and dentists. When billing for military personnel is
appropriate, the Navy Comptroller Manual prescribes two methods of
computation: one for services provided to a non-Defense Federal
agency and one for services provided to a non-Federal agency, state
government, local government, private party, or Foreign Military
Sales customer. (NAVCOMPT Manual 035750, para 3g). Both methods
use the CSMR and include the application of adjustments called
"acceleration factors" to provide for the accrual of "leave and
holiday" and "other personnel support costs". Until January 1, 1985,
the NAVCOMPT Manual also required the non-Federal agency rate to
include an acceleration factor of 33 percent for the "retirement
entitlement" accrual. After January 1, 1985, the retirement
24-
entitlement accrual was incorporated into the CSMR.
(NAVCOMPTNOTE 7041, 7 MAR 85)
For personnel costs attributed to Paramount Pictures,
each CSMR was adjusted by a leave and holiday rate of 14 percent
and by a personnel support rate of 6 percent for officers and 18
percent for enlisted (COMNAVAIRPAC, 011258Z, JUL 85, p. 3).
Because the Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) rate is
incorporated into the CSMR, both the NAVCOMPT Manual (035750,
para 3c) and NAVCOMPTNOTE 7041.4(b) stipulate that
When quarters are provided free of charge by a non-DoD
activity (private party or other Government agency), the BAQ
rate will be deducted from the applicable composite standard
miliary rate when billing military personnel services.
A differentiation was made between rates when
Paramount Pictures provided quarters free of charge to military
personnel and when they did not (COMNAVAIRPAC, 011258Z JUL 85,
p. 3). An example of the billing computation used in the Top Gun
production is provided in Table1-3. The computed hourly rates for
all pay grades are presented in Appendix A. Note that, when
Paramount Pictures provided quarters, the BAQ rates were adjusted
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by both the "leave and holiday" and the "other personnel support




Pay Grade 0-1 Pay Grade E-7
CMSR $1 6.20 $18.41
Leave and Holiday Accrual X 1.14 X 1.14
$18.47 $20.99
Other Personnel Support
Costs Accrual X 1.06 X 1.18
Rate with DON Paying BAQ $19.58 $24.77
Less BAQ Rate $ 2.00 $ 2.63
Rate with Paramount Providing QTRS... $17.58 $22.14
The personnel rates provided in Appendix A were em-
ployed when military personnel provided specific non-flight related
assistance. Examples of these services include towing aircraft to
static film locations or providing a security patrol to safeguard the
production company's equipment. Personnel costs traceable to
services provided for aircraft operations, maintenance, or base
operating support were already encompassed in the cost per flying
hour rates.
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DoD policy guidance did not specify whether production
companies should pay for the personnel costs of the project officers
who provide extensive assistance to these productions. CINCPACFLT
did not bill Paramount Pictures for the Top Gun project officer who
devoted as much as 15 hours a day for two months to the production.
(Inspector General, 1986, p. 9)
A special DoD policy was issued concerning military
"extras". This policy required that all extras be volunteers and in a
leave or liberty status. Volunteer extras both ashore and aboard
ships at sea could not be paid. Military personnel filmed while
performing normal duties and not providing any special assistance
to Paramount were not considered as extras nor were they
chargeable to Paramount Pictures. (CHINFO, 212240Z, JUN 85)
However, the production company was expected to make donations to
the Morale, Welfare and Recreation funds of those commands
providing assistance.
Although the donations to command Morale, Welfare and
Recreation funds were considered voluntary, evidence suggests that
some pressure was required in persuading Paramount to contribute.
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In a memo to Robert Manning (01-22 CHINFO), the NAVINFO West Top
Gun Project Officer writes:
Should Paramount not make donations, it could cause re-
percussions not only for future extras for their pictures, but
other production companies as well. (Stairs, April 2, 1986)
On November 5, 1987, over a year and a half later, Paramount
Pictures made a contribution of $20,100. This was distributed
among those commands that participated in the production of the
motion picture (Sherman, December 1, 1987).
Upon completion of the production, Paramount Pictures
was assessed $35,279.84 for the military personnel assistance
provided. (Boydston, March 6, 1987)
b. Civilian Personnel Cost
The same method was followed in determining charges
assessed for services provided by civilian personnel. In accordance
with the NAVCOMPT Manual, a retirement acceleration rate of 19.5
percent was applied to recover costs incurred by the Department of
the Navy for retirement, medical, and life insurance expenses
(NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume 3, 035875, para. 1b(2)1). Upon com-
pletion of the production, the United States Navy assessed
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Paramount Pictures $22,675.73 for civilian personnel costs.
(Boydston, March 6, 1987)
c. Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)
DODINST 5410.15 requires reimbursement for expenses
incurred in diversion of personnel from normal military locations
and operations. However, the Instruction does not provide guidance
as to whether the reimbursements should include the full cost of
salaries and benefits for those who are on temporary duty.
CINCPACFLT did not bill Paramount for the full costs of
salaries and benefits of 40 enlisted personnel on temporary duty to
assist in the production in August 1985. These 40 personnel were
assigned to the Naval Air Station, Miramar, CA, but were on TAD
orders to Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada, to service and maintain
Navy aircraft performing choreographed aerial sequences for the
production. Although the Inspector General's Office estimated that
the salaries and benefits of these personnel amounted to
approximately $96,000, Paramount was billed only $49,776 for the
personnel services provided. (Inspector General, 1986, p. 10)
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For Temporary Additional Duty required in the
production, Paramount Pictures was billed $25,782.59 (Boydston,
March 6, 1987).
4. Special Charges
Special charges refer to assistance that exceeded ship and
aircraft reimbursable charges. Examples include equipment rental,
operation of auxiliary equipment such as a ship's boats and cranes,
or flightline trucks performing other than normal operations. These
charges were reported separately. (COMNAVAIRPAC, 011258Z JUL
85, p. 2, para 2C)
The NAVCOMPT Manual stipulates that, when a service or
sale is made to private parties, a charge will be imposed to recover
the full cost incurred by the Department of the Navy or the fair
market value, whichever is higher (NAVCOMPT Manual, 035875,
para1b(1)). In order to accomplish this, the NAVCOMPT Manual
requires an asset use charge of 4 percent of direct costs be added to
cover depreciation and interest on investment in DoD owned fixed
assets, and that an administrative surcharge of 3 percent of total
costs be added to cover general and administrative costs of the DoD
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component (NAVCOMPT Manual, 035875, para 1b(2)4,6). The total
amount CINCPACFLT charged Paramount for these special services,
including the surcharges, was $21,315.64 (Boydston, March 6, 1987).
D. SUMMARY
Table 1-4 provides a summary of the final costs the United
States Navy charged Paramount Pictures for assistance provided in





c. Military Personnel 35,279.84
d. Civilian Personnel 22,675.73
e. Equipment Rental 20,293.51
f. Temporary Additional Duty 25,782.59
g. Telephone 1 34. 1
5
h. Administrative Surcharge of 3%
for items b through g 3,281 .63
i
. Replacement of Damaged Canopy 134,930.00
TOTAL: $1,241,902.48
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After the Navy's involvement in the motion picture Top Gun was
concluded, several significant changes took place with respect to
DoD policy governing this type of assistance to private parties.
These changes were embodied in the revised and updated DODINST
5410.16 of January 26, 1988. This revision was due, in part, to the
findings and recommendations of the audit conducted by the DoD
Inspector General in 1986. (Inspector General, 1986, pp. 11-14) The
next two chapters examine these changes and the cost accounting
procedures followed by the United States Navy in determining the
costs to assess the Paramount Pictures Corporation for assistance
provided in the filming of the motion picture The Hunt for Red
October.
32-
DOD COSTING POLICY REVISION AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines revisions to DoD policy regarding DoD
assistance provided to the entertainment industry, which took place
following the completion of DoD involvement in Paramount Picture's
production of the motion picture Top Gun. Offered first is a sum-
mation of the results of an audit conducted by the DoD Inspector
General in 1985 and 1986 which examined this type of DoD
assistance and which specifically concentrated on the Navy's
involvement with the Top Gun production. This is followed by an
examination of the changes made in DoD policy and guidance
regarding the cost accounting and reimbursement procedures used
when providing this type of assistance.
B. BACKGROUND
The DoD Inspector General conducted an audit from December
1985 to March 1986, which examined DoD assistance provided to
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movie and television producers. The objectives of the audit were
...to determine if agreements with producers protected the
interests of the government, to evaluate procedures and
controls to recover costs of assistance, and to determine if
disposition of reimbursement was proper. (Trodden, October
17, 1986, p. 2)
The audit focused mainly on the assistance provided by the Navy for
the Top Gun production, which included a thorough examination of bil
ling documentation and interviews with personnel from Navy and Air
Force units that provided assistance. The following is an examina-
tion of the findings and recommendations provided in the Inspector
General's Report on the Audit of Assistance to Movie and Television
Producers (Report No. 87-008, 1986).
C. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Inspector General concluded that reimbursements made by
Paramount Pictures for services provided by the Navy in the Top Gun
production were received in accordance with existing DoD policies.
However, the Inspector General stressed the need for "...clarification
of DoD policies regarding written agreements and the pricing of
assistance provided to producers" (Trodden, October 17, 1986, p. 1).
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1 . Written Sales Agreements
In examining past DoD involvement with the entertainment
industry, the Inspector General found that
From 1979 through 1985, the Services provided assistance for
seven movie or television productions without written sales
agreements specifying the assistance to be provided and the
reimbursement terms... DoD instructions on assistance to
movies and television producers do not require the Services
and the producers to sign a contract or a formal agreement
specifying the assistance to be provided and the reimburse-
ment terms. (Inspector General, 1986)
The Inspector General stated that the lack of a written agreement
contributed to a dispute between the Government and the producers
of the 1979 movie Final Countdown and also to a civil suit filed by
the Department of Justice against a former Navy squadron com-
mander and the producers of Final Countdown for conspiracy to
defraud the Government and breach of agreement. The Inspector
General audit report stated:
Some issues in the suit might have been avoided if both parties
had signed a written agreement covering the methods to be
used in determining the number of reimbursable flying hours
and the reimbursable cost of each flying hour. (Inspector
General, 1986, p. 4)
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The dispute in the Final Countdown production involved, in
part, disagreement over the definition of a chargeable flying hour.
The Government contended that billing for flying hours should
include takeoffs, landings, airborne refueling, and flying the
aircraft to filming locations. On the other hand, lawyers for the
producers argued that the movie company had agreed only to
reimburse the Navy for the cost of "flying scenes" (Inspector
General, 1986, p. 4). There was also disagreement over the per-
flight-hour cost of an F-14 fighter. The Government was suing to
recover costs totaling $691,105, based on the flight hour rate of
$4,126, while lawyers for the producers argued that the Navy's
costs was only $1,200 per flight hour. (Inspector General, 1986)
The Top Gun producers were billed for all flying hours, from
takeoffs to landings, which were recorded as production support.
The Inspector General reported that "these billing practices were
correct and should be incorporated in DoD policy for all productions."
(Inspector General, 1986, p. 7) Based on the above findings, the
Inspector General recommended that
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...the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) revise
DoD Instruction 5410.16 to require the Services to negotiate
written agreements with producers before the Services
provide assistance for commercial productions. (Inspector
General, 1986, p. 3)
The Inspector General recommended that these agreements
include detailed descriptions of the assistance to be provided (both
reimbursable and non-reimbursable), along with unit prices for each
type of reimbursable support and the methods to be used in deter-
mining the final charges. (Inspector General, 1986, p. 4)
2. DoD Policy concerning Billing Practices
The Inspector General found that "billing practices were not
standardized because DoD policies on billing have not been clearly
defined". (Trodden, October 17, 1986) The DoD Inspector General
concluded that this lack of standardization had resulted in large
variations in the per-flight-hour rates charged private parties for
the same types of aircraft used and, in the case of Top Gun, had
resulted in failure to bill for the use of government cameras,
assistance provided by public affairs officers, and the loss or
damage of Navy property (Inspector General, 1986, p. 7). From an
examination of billing procedures observed in the Top Gun
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production, the Inspector General stated in the audit report that
"Billing practices raised some questions that, in our opinion, should
be resolved by more explicit DoD policy guidance". In particular, the
Inspector General provided the OASD(PA) with seven "Recommenda-
tions for Corrective Action". (Inspector General, 1986, pp. 11-12)
These were as follows:
1. Require producers to pay for all flying hours related to
production assistance including takeoffs, landings, and
ferrying aircraft from military locations to filming sites.
2. Specify whether flying hour prices should include or exclude
petroleum, oil, lubricants, maintenance, crew per diem,
civilian pay, military pay, permanent change of station costs,
asset use charges, and administrative charges.
3. Specify whether asset use charges should be charged for all
equipment used to assist in movie or television productions.
4. Specify whether producers should be charged for the salaries
and benefits of public affairs officers who provide extensive
assistance to the producers.
5. Prescribe a method for billing for special personnel services
that are related to aircraft flights but not covered in flying
hour rates.
6. Specify whether producers should pay the full cost of the
salary and benefits of personnel while they are on temporary
assignment to provide production assistance.
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7. Specify whether producers should pay for equipment damaged
or lost by Government personnel while using the equipment to
assist the producers.
The next section provides a review of the Office of the
ASD(PA) response to these Inspector General recommendations.
D. The OSD(PA) RESPONSE TO AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS
In a memorandum sent to the Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing, the Office of the ASD(PA) agreed "in general" with the re-
commendations made in the audit report concerning written sales
agreements and DoD billing practices. (Simms, August 6, 1986)
With respect to sales agreements, the ASD(PA) stated he
intended to revise DODINST 5410.16 to require the Services to
negotiate written agreements with motion picture and television
producers before providing DoD assistance. (Simms, August 6, 1986).
However, the ASD(PA) also expressed that
...due to the nature of the television and motion picture
industry which necessitates near-constant script revision,
reshooting of scenes, weather unpredictability, etc., we would
point out that such agreements need to be general rather than
highly specific in their content. (Simms, August 6, 1986)
The ASD(PA) pointed out that DODINST 5410.16 already requires
producers to provide a detailed requirements list upon which cost
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estimates and billing procedures are based. However, the ASD(PA)
acknowledged the need for standardization and additional guidance
with respect to billing practices by stating:
DODINST 5410.15 should be revised to provide guidance on how
to establish the amount of expenses incurred by the
Government, define diversions of equipment, personnel or
material resources, and to provide examples to guide billing
activities. (Simms, August 6, 1986)
The ASD(PA) was concerned, however, that "procedures could
become so restrictive or cost prohibitive as to discourage producers
from seeking support" and that "it is in the best interest of the
Government to support productions that portray the military in a
positive and accurate light" (Simms, August 6, 1986). This same
concern is also expressed in DODINST 5410.15, which requires that
the production be authentic in its portrayal of military life
(November 3, 1966, Section V, paragraph A1).
Aside from the concerns described above, the ASD(PA) concurred
with all the Inspector General audit recommendations and stated:
Concerns raised in the draft audit will be addressed in
revisions to DoD Instructions 5410.15 and 5410.16, which are
expected to be published by the beginning of calender year
1987. (Simms, August 6, 1986)
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E. REVISION OF DODINST 5410.16
Due in part to the concerns raised by the DoD Inspector General
in its Report on the Audit of Assistance to Movie and Television
Producers, the ASD(PA) updated and revised the January 21, 1964
DODINST 5410.16. The revised DODINST 5410.16, dated January 26,
1988, is titled DoD Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-
Oriented Motion Picture, Television, and Video Productions. The in-
struction incorporates most of the recommendations made by the
Inspector General and provides additional guidance concerning
Government reimbursements. Like its predecessor, the new instruc-
tion implements the authority contained in DODINST 5410.15.
Similarly, both versions of 5410.16 require that the ASD(PA)
approve not only the production company's script proposal but also a
detailed Requirements Lists (described later) before DoD assistance
is authorized (DODINST 5410.16, Para E.1d). However, unlike its
predecessor, the revised DODINST 5410.16 also provides thirteen
guidelines to aid DoD components in determining exactly what
Government incurred costs require reimbursement. (DODINST
5410.16, E.4b) These guidelines are as follows:
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(1) Petroleum, oil, and lubricants for equipment used.
(2) Resultant depot maintenance.
(3) Expendable supplies.
(4) Travel and per diem (unless paid directly to the member).
(5) Civilian overtime.
(6) Replenishment spares.
(7) Lost or damaged equipment.
(8) Commercial power or other utilities for facilities kept
open beyond normal duty hours or in such cases where the
consumption of utilities is significant.
(9) Costs incurred in diverting or moving equipment to a
specific location to support the production requirements.
(10) All flying hours related to production assistance, includ-
ing takeoffs, landings, and ferrying aircraft, except when
such missions coincide with and can be considered
legitimate operational and training missions.
(11) The production company shall not be required to reimburse
the Government for military or civilian manpower (except
for civilian overtime) when such personnel are officially
assigned to assist in the production.
(12) Normal training and operational missions that would occur
regardless of DoD assistance are not considered charge-
able.
(13) Beyond actual operational expenses, no charges shall be
levied for asset usage (i.e., rental or depreciation factors).
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These guidelines contain many of the recommendations
presented in the Inspector General's audit report. Guideline number
(7) addresses the issue raised by the Inspector General regarding the
loss or damage of Government equipment. Guideline number (9)
incorporates the recommendation for the clarification of "diversion"
used in DODINST 5410.15. Guideline number (10) addresses the
problem raised during the Final Countdown production regarding the
definition of a reimbursable flight hour. Guideline number (11)
demonstrates a change in DoD policy concerning the reimbursement
of military and civilian personnel costs. The Defense Department no
longer requires reimbursement for the costs incurred in providing
personnel support in a motion picture or television production. This
is a shift from the cost accounting procedures followed during the
Top Gun production, in which DoD required Paramount Pictures to
reimburse the Government for $35,279.84 in military personnel
costs and $22,675.73 in civilian personnel costs. In a telephone
conversation with the author, the Director of NAVINFO West stated :
We stopped charging for military and civilian personnel costs
partly because we have so much artistic control over the
productions, but also because the Navy would still be writing
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the same paychecks whether we helped in the productions or
not. (Sherman, telephone conversation, March 21, 1991)
Another change in DoD policy is expressed in Guideline number
(13), which addresses the Inspector General recommendation for
clarification of DoD policy regarding asset use charges. DoD now
excludes any charges for asset usage. This, too, is a shift from
procedures followed in earlier productions. For example, in the Top
Gun production, CINCPACFLT charged Paramount for asset use when
aircraft, tractors, and forklifts were used to assist in production.
(Inspector General, 1986, p. 9). This asset usage charge was incor-
porated into the flight hour and equipment rental rates developed
specifically for the Top Gun production.
In addition to providing the thirteen billing guidelines described
above, the revised DODINST 5410.16 also differs from its
predecessor by incorporating the Inspector General recommendation
for written agreements. Paragraph C2 of the new instruction states:
The producer shall be required to sign a written "Reimburse-
ment Agreement" with the appropriate DoD Component(s)...
before receiving DoD assistance.
The revised DoD instruction provides a sample Reimbursement
Agreement (Appendix B) which is to include a Requirements List
44-
(Appendix C) similar to the one contained in the earlier instruction.
Both versions of the Requirements List include a detailed de-
scription of exactly which Government assets will be required and
when, where, and how they will be used in the production. However,
the revised Requirements List replaces the last column in the 1966
version, entitled "Remarks", with a column specifically for "DoD
Estimated Costs". Although the 1966 DoD instruction mandated the
use of a Requirements List, it did not call for a formal agreement,
signed by both parties, specifying reimbursement terms. The Reim-
bursement Agreement described in the 1988 instruction requires the
production company "to abide by DODINST 5410.16" and authorizes
"minor deviations" from the Requirements List, provided there is
"mutual consent" between DoD and the production company. (DODINST
5410.16, January 26, 1988, p. 1-1)
In both the 1964 and 1988 versions of DODINST 5410.16, the
ASD(PA) authorizes DoD components to provide assistance to pro-
ducers prior to DoD approval of a script or, in the revised version,
before the signing of a Reimbursement Agreement. The revised
DODINST 5410.16 states
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...DoD Components are authorized to assist non-Government
producers, scriptwriters, etc., in their efforts to develop a
script that might ultimately qualify for DoD assistance. Such
activities could include guidance, suggestions, access for
technical research, etc. (para D.2a)
In addition to the required Reimbursement Agreement, the
revised DODINST 5410.16 contains two other requirements for as-
sistance which were not included in the 1964 version. After the
ASD(PA) approves a script and authorizes DoD assistance, the
revised DODINST 5410.16 specifically mandates that the production
company "post advance payment or a sufficient Letter of Credit to
cover the estimated costs before receiving DoD assistance"
(DODINST 541 0.1 6. C2, p. 2). Although this has been the customary
practice, as demonstrated in earlier productions, the ASD(PA) did
not promulgate the requirement as DoD policy until the 1988 DoD
instruction. The new instruction provides a sample Letter of Credit.
The second prerequisite is provided in paragraph C8 of the
instruction. Here DoD policy requires the production company to
provide "proof of adequate industry standard liability insurance" and
to execute "Hold Harmless" agreements with each DoD component
providing assistance in the production. Indemnification agreements
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were already an established procedure, as demonstrated in earlier
productions such as Final Countdown and Top Gun, although they
were not specifically mandated in the 1964 DODINST 5410.16. The
revised DoD instruction provides a sample Hold Harmless agreement
which does not include the DoD Inspector General recommendation
that such agreements address reimbursement by the production com-
pany for the loss or damage of equipment by Government personnel
who are assisting in the production. (Inspector General, 1986, p. 11)
F. SUMMARY
The January 26, 1988 DODINST 5410.16 contains many of the
same delegations of responsibilities and DoD production assistance
requirements as its 1964 predecessor. However, the revised DoD
instruction also includes recommendations suggested in the 1985
Inspector General audit: the thirteen billing guidelines, the Reim-
bursement Agreement, the revised Requirements List, the Letter of
Credit, and the Hold Harmless agreement.
The next chapter examines how the changes embodied in the
revised DODINST 5410.16 were later implemented, by examining the
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cost accounting procedures used by the United States Navy in
determining the costs to assess the Paramount Pictures Corporation
for assistance provided in the filming of the motion picture The
Hunt for Red October.
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IV. DOD INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE MOTION
PICTURE THE HUNT FOR RED OCTOBER
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the procedures followed by the United
States Navy in determining the costs to assess the Paramount
Pictures Corporation for assistance provided in the filming of the
motion picture The Hunt for Red October.
Offered first is a brief explanation of the Navy's involvement
with Paramount Pictures, as well as the DoD policies governing this
type of assistance. This is followed by a detailed examination of the
various types of DoD costs involved and the procedures used to
derive the charges assessed for DoD support in the production.
B. BACKGROUND
Paramount's motion picture The Hunt for Red October is based on
Tom Clancy's best selling novel, which portrays a modern, high-tech
Navy in the hunt for a Soviet skipper and his officer crew, who are
defecting with one of the Soviet Union's most advanced nuclear
submarines -- the Red October.
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In December of 1988, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) approved the screenplay and
authorized DoD assistance in the production of The Hunt for Red
October (Baruch, 1988). This assistance was subject to compliance
with all requirements specified in DODINST 5410.16 dated January
26, 1988 (Baruch, 1988). The Navy Office of Information West
(NAVINFO West) served as project coordinator and assigned a
project officer to the production. Principal photography began on
April 3, 1989 in the Puget Sound area, off Port Angeles, in the
State of Washington. Filming continued through July 20, 1989, with
three additional days of shooting required on November 22,
December 10th and December 18th. Navy support involved, in part,
the use of five submarines, four guided missile frigates, and one
aircraft carrier. (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990)
The motion picture The Hunt for Red October premiered on
February 26, 1990 and as of February 1, 1991 had accumulated box
office sales of $131.5 million. (Hollywood Reporter, April 3, 1991)
The Paramount Pictures Corporation paid reimbursements in the
amount of $325,215.11 for production assistance provided by the
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United States Navy. (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990, p. 6). The
following is an analysis of the methods and the cost accounting
procedures observed by the United States Navy in providing this type
of assistance to Paramount Pictures.
C. DOD BILLING AND COST ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
With respect to DoD transactions involving private parties,
DODINST 5410.16 dated January 26, 1988, DODINST 5410.15 dated
November 3, 1966, and the Navy Comptroller Manual were the main
sources of guidance in effect when Paramount Pictures first re-
quested assistance from the United States Navy in the production of
The Hunt for Red October.
In The Hunt for Red October After Action Report, NAVINFO West
described the Navy's involvement in this production by dividing the
assistance given into three parts: (1) Pre-Production, (2) Principal
Photography, and (3) Post-Production. The following is an exam-
ination of the cost accounting procedures implemented during each
of these phases. (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990, p.1)
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1 . Pre-Production
The script for The Hunt for Red October and Paramount Pic-
ture's initial Requirements List were approved by the ASD(PA) on
December 27, 1988. Although DoD assistance was authorized, the
ASD(PA) indicated that Paramount's initial request for assistance
did not fully meet the requirements of DODINST 5410.16, since it did
not describe, by scene, the military assistance requested or the
expected costs to the Government (Baruch, 1988). In a memorandum
from the OASD(PA), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs), to the Chief of Information (CHINFO), the Special
Assistant (Audiovisual) suggested
...that we receive the request for assistance from the company
in the customary form, by scene references with appropriate
notations about appropriate costs. ...Meanwhile, any filming of
opportunity for stock or set design should be accommodated.
(Baruch, 1988)
Based on this initial approval, Pre-Production meetings with
NAVINFO West began in January 1989 and involved discussions on
what particular Navy assets would be required, as well as the
quality and extent of support needed.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, once the ASD(PA)
approves a script and authorizes DoD assistance, DODINST 5410.16
specifically mandates that, before receiving any additional DoD
assistance, the production company must (1) sign a Reimbursement
Agreement, and (2) post advance payment or a sufficient Letter of
Credit to cover the expected costs (DODINST 5410.16, paragraph C2).
NAVINFO West stated that a Reimbursement Agreement for The Hunt
For Red October production was not necessary since an adequate
Letter of Credit had been established by Paramount Pictures
(NAVINFO West, January 22, 1991). To satisfy the second require-
ment, Paramount Pictures established a Letter of Credit in March of
1989, which was issued through the National Westminster Bank USA
of New York. The Letter of Credit, number 301971, was in the
aggregate amount of $200,000 and was effective until August 31,
1989. (National Westminster Bank USA, 1989)
DODINST 5410.16 also requires that the production company
execute Hold Harmless agreements with each DoD component
assisting in the production (paragraph C8). Paramount Pictures
established an all-inclusive Hold Harmless agreement, dated March
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29, 1989, which agreed to
...indemnify the United States up to an amount not to exceed
$25,000,000 for any damage to property of the United States
or others or for personal injury (including death) to any person
or persons proximately caused by the fault or negligence of
Paramount, its agents, employees, or subcontractors in con-
nection with the production. (Kamon, 1989)
This indemnification agreement did not incorporate the
recommendation made by the DoD Inspector General, which was to
have the agreement address reimbursement by the production
company for the loss or damage of equipment used by Government
personnel assisting in the production. (Inspector General, 1986)
Once these prerequisites were satisfied, and after the
ASD(PA) approved the script and Requirements List, CHINFO
instructed those commands providing assistance in The Hunt for Red
October to document all expenses in accordance with DODINST
5410.16 and to submit these charges to NAVINFO West upon
completion of filming on site. NAVINFO West would then present
consolidated charges to CINCPACFLT for preparation of billing to the
Paramount Pictures Corporation. (CHINFO, 071429Z April 89)
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During the pre-production phase, cast and production crews
embarked in aircraft, surface ships, and submarines to research
dialogue, costume and set design. Production designers visited Los
Angeles Class nuclear submarines (SSN's) in San Diego, where they
examined ship design and shot still photos in order to build a mock-
up of the USS Dallas on the sound stage at Paramount. The photos
and their negatives, along with submarine schematics of various
areas of the ships, all underwent security review by such
organizations as the Naval Sea Systems Command. Real Russian
immigrants were employed by Paramount to add a sense of realism
to the scenes. These Russian extras were required to undergo
background checks, performed by the Naval Intelligence Service, in
order to embark on Navy ships used in the production. (NAVINFO
West, February 2, 1990)
Navy support in this phase also included required aviation
and swim physiology for cast and crew members who would embark
in helicopters. (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990, A.3)
The United States Navy did not charge Paramount Pictures
for any of the labor services and assistance described above. This
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was based on the revised DODINST 5410.16, which no longer requires
the production company to reimburse the Government for military or
civilian labor expenses other than civilian overtime. (DODINST
5410.16, paragraph 4b11)
Based on this direction, the only labor charges assessed to
Paramount Pictures for the entire production involved overtime
expenses for six civilian employees needed to operate cranes
provided by NAS Alameda and overtime for civilian tugboat crews.
(CINCPACFLT Bill NO. R0007089SF00016). CINCPACFLT did not bill
Paramount Pictures for the labor hours NAVINFO West personnel
devoted to the production, nor for the work performed by Navy
personnel from the various Comptroller and Public Affairs Offices
involved in The Hunt for Red October production.
2. Principal Photography
All of the charges assessed to Paramount Pictures for DoD
assistance in the production were incurred during this principal
phase. Principal photography involving the United States Navy began
on April 18, 1989 at Port Angeles, WA, in the Puget Sound area. This
photography involved USS HOUSTON (SSN-713), USS REUBEN JAMES
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(FFG-57) with embarked Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron, Light
Four Three (HSL-43), and a two plane detachment from Helicopter
Antisubmarine Squadron, Light Two (HSL-2). The USS REUBEN JAMES
was moored at the commercial terminal, with support for the heli-
copter squadrons provided by NAS Whidbey Island. The USS HOUSTON
operated from an ad hoc submarine base at the United States Coast
Guard Air Station, Port Angeles. (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990,
B2) In June, filming continued at the Long Beach Naval Station,
where the film company embarked on four different Oliver Hazard
Perry Class frigates. USS HOUSTON also provided filming support
there for two days. The film crew embarked in USS ENTERPRISE (CVN
65) on the 8th and 9th of June to complete the major portion of the
at-sea filming. Subsequent to reimbursement, two additional days
of filming were requested and approved for 22 November and 10
December 1989. Additionally, a helicopter flight of three hours was
approved for 18 December in order to acquire necessary sound
effects. For this production assistance provided by the United States
Navy, Paramount Pictures paid reimbursements in the amount of
$324,956.15 (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990).
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The following is an examination of the billings submitted by
those DoD components that provided assistance in the production, as
well as the procedures used in determining the principal charges
which required reimbursement by Paramount Pictures.
a. Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific
(COMNAVAIRPAC)
The majority of the COMNAVAIRPAC services provided
involved the use of various types of Naval aircraft. These included
the SH-3H and SH-60B helicopters, the C-2A transport, the E2-C
Hawkeye, and the F-14A Tomcat. COMNAVAIRPAC determined the
flight hour rates for each of these aircraft based on their respective
OP-20 reports. These reports provide detailed cost information by
program element (e.g., manpower, material, fuel) for each type of
aircraft. This enabled COMNAVAIRPAC to select those particular
costs which qualified for reimbursement under CHINFO guidance. As
a result, flight hour rates covered expenses for fuel, maintenance,
depot level repairables, and base operating costs for such items as
the ancillary equipment used in support of the aircraft. CINCPACFLT
billed the Paramount Pictures Corporation $153,953.22 for the
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COMNAVAIRPAC support described in Table 4-1. (NAVINFO West, 31
Jan 1990, and CINCPACFLT Bill Number R0007089SF00016)
COMNAVAIRPAC non-flying expenses included rental
charges for a van and a pickup truck used by HSL-43 and for a crane,
plus required civilian overtime provided by NAS Alameda. NAVCOMPT
Manual 035881, Government-Owned Equipment Rental to Private
Parties, provides rental rates for the use of a variety of trucks,
vans, and cranes found in the Navy's inventory. Whether or not these
rates were applied in determining charges in this production cannot
be determined due to the lack of specificity in the billing invoices
with respect to the actual type and size of vehicles used.
Table 4-1
Squadron Aircraft Flight Cost Per Total Cost
Requested Hours Hour
HS-2 SH-3H 87.9 856.00 75,242.40
HS-6 SH-3H 5.6 856.00 4,793.60
HS-8 SH-3H 29.9 856.00 25,594.40
HSL-43 SH-60B 13.6 885.00 12,036.00
VRC-30 C-2A 3.3 1,873.00 6,180.90
VF-213 F-14A 6.5 3,291.00 21,391.50
VAW-117 E2-C 3.8 2,107.00 8,006.60
Total Charges for Flight Hours 1 53,245.40
COMNAVAIRPAC Non-flying Expenses 707.82
TOTAL COMNAVAIRPAC Charges $153,953.22
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b. Commander Submarine Forces, Pacific
(COMSUBPAC)
COMSUBPAC charged Paramount Pictures the hourly rate
of $397.00 for the use of a nuclear submarine. This reimbursement
rate was derived to recoup expenses for the petroleum, oil, and
lubricants consumed in daily operations. (Raaz, April 9, 1991)
Since there was no existing support facility for the USS
HOUSTON at the United States Coast Guard Air Station, Port Angeles,
a T-pier had to be constructed. Two forty foot camels were towed
in and installed by a 30 ton floating crane brought in from Seattle
(NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990, p. 8). A generator, a sewage hold-
ing tank, and a bilge tank/waste oil tank were also installed. The
Bangor, WA Submarine Base submitted charges of $3,400.00 for the
delivery and retrieval of these camels and $737.00 for the trans-
portation and overtime expenses of the civilian employees.
COMSUBPAC charges also included $1,481 for a Torpedo Retriever,
which covered expenses for diesel fuel and lube oil comsumed.
c. Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific
(COMNAVSURFPAC)
CINCPACFLT billed Paramount Pictures $80,280.70 for
the use of four Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates (FFG's). The
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Comptroller derived this charge by assessing Paramount the hourly
rate of $1,102.00 for the 72.85 hours of FFG service provided. How
this rate was developed or what expenses it actually covered could
not be explained by staff at the CINCPACFLT Comptroller Office,
NAVINFO West, the COMNAVSURFPAC Comptroller Office, CHINFO,
the COMNAVSURFPAC Public Affairs Office, or the individual FFG
Commands.
Paramount Pictures reimbursed COMNAVSURFPAC
$80,370.70, which included the charges described above and $90.00
for the loss of one folding table. (CINCPACFLT Bill Number
R0007090SF00001, Bill Number R0007089SF00016, and NAVINFO
West, 31 JAN 1990)
d. Naval Station Long Beach, California
Naval Station Long Beach provided 51.5 hours of yard
oiler (YO) and yard tugboat service (YTB, large harbor tugboat) in
support of the production (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990, 2B.2).
The same hourly rate of $225.00 was applied to both the YO and YTB,
which are different with regards to size, engine type, and fuel
consumption rate (Janes Fighting Ships, 1989). Paramount Pictures
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was charged $4,500.00 for 20 hours of YO service, $7,087.50 for
31.5 hours of YTB service, and an additional $1,498.37 for mis-
cellaneous expenses that included civilian tugboat pilot overtime,
crane usage, and paint.
e. Naval Shipyard - Puget Sound, Washington
To assist in the production, the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard provided a yard tugboat (YTB-767) for submarine support at
Port Angeles. CINCPACFLT required a reimbursement of $1,626.90
for the 22 hours of tugboat service provided, as well as an
additional $2,187.50 for a commercial stand-by tugboat. The
commercial tug was required until the Navy tugboat was no longer
needed in the production. Staff at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Comptroller Office were unable to provide details as to how these
charges were derived, or what DoD expenses they covered (Telephone
conversations with personnel from Puget Sound Comptroller Office,
April 8, 1991). The $73.95 YTB hourly rate used ($1,626.90/22 hrs)
does not equate to the $225.00 hourly rate used for YTB services
provided by the Long Beach Naval Station. NAVINFO West stated that
the rates differed because the individual commands established
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their own hourly rates to recover the expenses of the civilian tug-
boats required to replace the Navy tugboats used in the production.
The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard also provided services
which were not listed on the original CINCPACFLT billings. Prior to
receiving these services, Paramount Pictures established a Special
Deposit in the amount of $3,000 with the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard. This Special Deposit served the same function as the
Letter of Credit already issued by Paramount. The Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard charged $945.23 against the Special Deposit for services
described on the billing invoice as "Provide props for movie" (Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard Invoice Order No. 80900). This billing included
a surcharge of 15 percent for the assistance provided. Paramount
Pictures received a refund for the remaining balance of $2,054.77
upon completion of filming in the Puget Sound area. Explanations for
the necessity of this Special Deposit or for the 15 percent surcharge
were unattainable due, in large part, to reassignment of the comp-
troller personnel responsible for generating the original invoices.
(Telephone conversations with personnel from Puget Sound Comp-
toller Office, April 8, 1991)
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f. Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station
In support of USS HOUSTON and USS REUBEN JAMES
during filming off Port Angeles, the Naval Undersea Warfare
Engineering Station at Keyport, WA provided a yard tugboat and crew
(YTB-836). Paramount paid per diem and billiting costs for the
tugboat crew, and was assessed an hourly rate of $52.50 for the 28.5
hours of tugboat service. This YTB hourly rate differs from the YTB
rates used by other DoD components. Although Paramount Pictures
reimbursed the Navy for the total costs of $1,496.24, the Budget
Officer of the Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station stated
that the Station itself was never reimbursed. (Telephone conver-
sation with Budget officer, April 10, 1991).
g. Commander Special Boat Squadron One
(COMSPECBOATRON)
In support of the production, Patrol boats 737 and 755
from COMSPECBOATRON ONE conducted two round trip runs from San
Diego to Long Beach. The Paramount Pictures Corporation was
charged $2,137.20 for the 3,288 gallons of fuel consumed.
(CINCPACFLT Bill Number R0007090SF00001)
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h. Commander Naval Submarine Training Facility
(COMSUBTRAFAC)
The charge of $28.20 consisted of items requested by
NAVINFO West in support of the production. This included items such
as range rate slide rules and a maneuvering board tablet, which were
all billed at their unit cost.
i. Administrative Surcharge
CINCPACFLT assessed Paramount Pictures an admin-
istrative surcharge of $9,472.28 based on guidance from the July 29,
1985 DODINST 7230.7 entitled User Charges (CINCPACFLT Bill
Numbers R0007090SF00001 , R0007089SF00016, and NAVINFO West,
31 Jan 1990). Paragraph F.2a(6) of DODINST 7230.7 stipulates that
an administrative surcharge of three percent of total costs may be
assessed in order "to cover general and administrative cost of the
DoD Component". This same instruction also states that cost com-
putations may include charges for depreciation and the full costs of
civilian and military personnel services (paragraphs F.2a(1,2, and 4).
In billing for DoD assistance provided in The Hunt for Red October
production, CINCPACFLT was not required under DODINST 7230.7 to
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seek reimbursement for these types of costs since the Instruction
also states that "(t)he provisions of this Instruction do not apply
when other statutes or directives require different practices or
procedures...." DODINST 5410.15 is listed in the instruction as one of
these "other directives".
Neither DODINST 5410.15 nor DODINST 5410.16
specifically mentions the use of administrative surcharges, although
paragraph 4b(13) of DODINST 5410.16 stipulates that, "(b)eyond
actual operational expenses, no charges shall be levied for asset
usage (i.e., rental and/or depreciation factors)."
j . Military and Civilian Personnel Costs
Of the total expenses charged to Paramount Pictures,
less than $500 or 0.15 percent involved reimbursement for labor
costs. As mentioned earlier, DODINST 5410.16 requires reimburse-
ment for civilian overtime expenses only (DODINST 5410.16, January
26, 1988, para 4(b)11). With regard to military personnel appearing
in the film, DODINST 5410.16, paragraph C9 stipulates:
Military personnel in an off-duty, nonofficial status may be
hired by the production company to perform as actors, extras,
etc., provided there is no conflict with any existing Service
regulation.
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At sea, military film extras were used from all units in
which the Paramount film crew embarked and, in keeping with
DODINST 5410.16, these extras were not paid. In port, CHINFO
required military personnel appearing in the film to be in a leave or
liberty status (CHINFO, 071429Z APR 89). Eleven Navy personnel,
nine enlisted and two officers, were hired for scenes filmed at the
Paramount studio. (NAVINFO West, February 2, 1990, p. 5)
3. Post-Production
CHINFO assigned a Lieutenant Commander (0-4) to oversee
post-production operations, which primarily involved dealing with
the large number of requests for premieres, charity screenings and
special screenings received from around the world. (NAVINFO West,
February 2,1990, p. 6). Again, the Navy did not require reimburse-
ment for such services in accordance with DODINST 5410.16.
D. SUMMARY
The United States Navy submitted billing after primary
photography was completed on July 20, 1989. Three separate bills
were submitted by CINCPACFLT to the Paramount Pictures Corpor-
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ation, with additional charges required for support provided in
November and December. The total reimbursement made by the
Paramount Pictures Corporation was in the amount of $325,215.11
(NAVINFO WEST, February 2, 1990).
Production companies have traditionally made donations to the
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation accounts of those commands
involved in the production. Upon completion of The Hunt for Red
October production, the producers provided a donation of $22,500 to
fourteen DoD components. (DeWaay, December 19, 1989).
Table 4-2 provides a summary of the total expenses CINCPACFLT
billed Paramount Pictures for the assistance provided by the various
DoD Components participating in the production (CINCPACFLT Bill
Number R0007090SF00001 and Bill Number R0007089SF00016).
In order to gain a better understanding of DoD policy regarding
assistance to private parties, the next chapter examines the cost
reimbursement policies followed in providing assistance to a
private party outside the entertainment industry. In particular, the
chapter provides an examination of the Navy's involvement in the





USS HOUSTON (SSN-713) 49,228.00
USS LOUISVILLE (SSN-724) 5,558.00




USS WADSWORTH (FFG-9) 1 3,058.70
USS GEORGE PHILIP (FFG-12)... 1 0,008.00
USS GARY (FFG-51) 26,448.00
USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG-57)... 30.856.00
Subtotal 80,370.70
D. NAVAL STATION - Long Beach, CA
Yard Oiler 4,500.00
Yard Tugboat 7,087.50
Miscellaneous Charges 1 .498.37
Subtotal 13,085.87
E Naval Shipyard - Puget Sound,WA 3,814.40
F. Naval Undersea Warfare Station 1,496.24
G COMSPECBOATRONONE
Patrol Boat 737 and 755 2,137.20
H. COMSUBTRAFAC 28.20
Total 315,742.83
I. 3 Percent Administrative Surcharge 9.472.28
TOTAL BILLING $325,215.11
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V. DOD SUPPORT OF THE EXXON VALDEZ
OIL SPILL CLEANUP OPERATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the cost reimbursement policies and
billing procedures followed in determining the costs to assess the
Exxon Corporation for federal assistance provided in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill cleanup operation. Offered first is a brief ex-
planation of federal government involvement in this cleanup, as well
as the policies governing reimbursement for this type of assistance
provided to private parties. This is followed by an examination of
the major costs incurred by the DoD and, in particular, the methods
used to determine cost reimbursements for the assistance provided
by United States Navy.
B. BACKGROUND
On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on
Bligh Reef, spilling over 10 million gallons of crude oil into Prince
William Sound, Alaska (GAO, October 30, 1989). This spill, the
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largest in U.S. history, required an extensive cleanup operation in
which the Exxon Corporation spent almost two billion dollars as of
January, 1991 (GAO Draft Report, March 1991). At the time of the
Exxon Valdez spill, the Clean Water Act was the principal policy
guidance governing federal response to major oil spills. In
particular, this Act addresses those oil spill cleanups in cases
which require resources beyond the capabilities of the spiller or in
situations where the spiller is unknown or unwilling to take
responsibility for the spill. This Act holds the spiller liable for the
costs of oil removal up to $150 per gross ton of oil tanker. Although
the gross tonnage of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker was roughly 95,000
tons, making Exxon's liability $14.3 million, Exxon assumed financial
responsibility for the entire cleanup operation (GAO Draft Report,
March 1991, p. 14). The Clean Water Act does stipulate that there is
no limitation as to the spider's liability if willful negligence or
misconduct is proven.
The Clean Water Act provides for a National Contingency Plan,
developed by the President, "to provide efficient, coordinated, and
effective action for minimizing damage from oil spills..." (GAO,
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October 30, 1989, p. 12). The first National Contingency Plan was
adopted in 1968 and the current plan is found in chapter 40, part 300
of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (GAO, October 30, 1989, p.
13). Although the plan establishes separate roles for twelve federal
agencies in response to an oil spill, only ten actually participated in
the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation (GAO Draft Report,
March 1991, p. 49). These were the Departments of Defense, Labor,
the Interior, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, Energy, Transpor-
tation, Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection
Agency (GAO, October 30, 1989, p. 12 ). The State Department and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency are the two agencies
designated in the plan that were not involved in the Exxon Valdez
operation. The ten federal agencies contributed to the cleanup effort
by monitoring and supporting the operation, removing oil from the
water and beaches, dealing with dead and injured wildlife, and
assessing damage to the environment. (GAO, January 26, 1990, p. 2)
As of June 30, 1990, these agencies had incurred and subsequently
reported spill related costs totaling $152.9 million. The Exxon
Corporation reimbursed the Government for $114.9 million as of
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September 30, 1990, with an additional $7.5 million in the process
of transfer. Recovery of the remaining $30.5 million of reported
costs is uncertain for reasons that are discussed later. (GAO Draft
Report, March 1991, p. 25)
The following section describes the policies in effect at the
time of the spill, and the cost accounting procedures used by the
Government for collecting reimbursements from the Exxon Corpora-
tion for the assistance provided in the cleanup operation.
C. GOVERNMENT BILLING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES
FOLLOWED DURING THE CLEANUP OPERATION
Nine of the ten federal agencies involved sought full or partial
reimbursement for the services provided in support of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill cleanup; the Department of Energy did not track and
bill for costs incurred. The agencies that sought reimbursement used
two approaches: the 311(k) fund and Direct Agreement. (GAO, January
26, 1990, p. 18)
1. Reimbursement Under 311(K) of The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act provides guidance for federal
assistance in the cleanup of oil spills, and designates the United
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States Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation, as the
agent responsible for the day-to-day coordination of federal cleanup
activities (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 11). Subsection 31 1 (k)
of the Clean Water Act authorizes the use of a revolving fund for oil
removal activities in which the federal government has assumed
charge of the cleanup operation. This revolving fund is funded mainly
through appropriations, with the spiller reimbursing the federal
government for those costs incurred in the actual cleanup of oil
from the water and shorelines. The fund is not used for damage
assessment costs or restoration costs. Although Exxon took charge
of the cleanup operation in the Exxon Valdez spill, the Coast Guard
began using the 31 1 (k) fund because of the magnitude of the spill
and the substantial federal involvement required (GAO, January
26,1990, p. 19). As mandated in the act, the Coast Guard required all
agencies (1) to seek advance authorization of their spill related
activities from the Coast Guard on-scene coordinator and (2) to
submit the costs of these activities to the Coast Guard for approval
and referral to Exxon for reimbursement. Exxon would then
reimburse the 31 1 (k) fund through the Coast Guard which, in turn,
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would reimburse each federal agency for the costs incurred. Seven
of the ten agencies involved in the cleanup sought reimbursement
under this process, and this included the Department of Defense.
Figure 5-1 presents a diagram of this flow of funds. (GAO, January
26, 1990, pp. 218-20)
Figure 5-1
Federal Agencies Submit Costs
to Coast Guard for Approval
Coast Guard Passes on Reim-
bursements to Federal Agencies <
Coast Guard Submits to Exxon
* Costs it approves from
other agencies
* Its own costs
Exxon Reimburses the 31 1 (k)
fund for costs approved by USCG
2. Reimbursement Through Direct Agreement
Three of the nine federal agencies providing services sought
reimbursement through direct agreements with Exxon. Two of the
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three agencies were also using the 311(K) process for costs not
covered under these direct agreements. The agreements mainly
involved recoupment of damage assessment costs incurred by the
State of Alaska and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and
the Interior. This method of reimbursement was not employed by the
Department of Defense. (GAO, January 26, 1990, p. 18)
With respect to reimbursements, the GAO report points out
that there was confusion among the agencies involved regarding the
reimbursement process to be followed during the Exxon Valdez oil
spill cleanup operation. Several agencies, including the Departments
of the Interior and Commerce, assumed that "the criteria for using
the 31 1(k) fund had not been met in that the Coast Guard had neither
requested their services nor assumed control for managing the
cleanup from Exxon" (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 50). They
assumed that they would have to fund their own cleanup activities,
as stipulated under the National Contingency Plan. The GAO report
stated that four federal agencies, including DoD, were not informed
until May 12, 1989, six weeks after the spill occurred, that the
31 1(k) fund would actually be used. (GAO Draft Report, March 1991,
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p. 51) In addition, the Coast Guard did not provide the "specificity
needed" and "agencies did not apply consistent methods, criteria, and
standards to determine billed charges". The GAO found examples of
both under- and over- billing of costs "...perhaps exceeding, in total,
$5 million dollars". (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 53)
Although DoD was not affected, the GAO also concluded that
several federal agencies had not received reimbursements for some
of their costs because "Coast Guard interpretations limited reim-
bursements from the pollution fund" (GAO Draft Report, March 1991,
p. 4). The Clean Water Act specifies that agencies can obtain
reimbursement from the 31 1 (k) fund for "oil removal activities", and
regulations stipulate that the on-scene coordinator is responsible
for determining which activities fall under that definition (GAO,
Draft Report, March 1991, p. 40). The GAO report stated that the act
defines oil removal as
removal of oil. ..from the water and shorelines or the taking of
such actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate
damage to the public health or welfare, including, but not
limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private
property, shorelines, and beaches (GAO Draft Report, March
1991, p. 40).
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According to the GAO, the on-scene coordinator has
"considerable latitude" in determining what is an oil removal
activity and, in the Exxon Valdez case, some agency activities were
not reimbursed because the on-scene coordinator did not believe the
activities were oil removal functions. The Chief of the Marine
Environmental Safety Division in Coast Guard headquarters told the
GAO that "...the coordinator is expected to make decisions based on
his/her judgement... and that coordinators' decisions will differ
from one spill to another" (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 42). The
Coast Guard typically tries to minimize cost reimbursements for
two reasons: (1) to encourage the spiller to maintain management
control of the cleanup operation and to provide all the necessary
resources and (2) to avoid possible depletion of the 31 1(k) fund (GAO
Draft Report, March 1991, p. 43).
Although the 31 1(k) fund is authorized at $35 million, the
balance at the time of the Valdez spill was only $6.7 million which,
according to the GAO, was "enough to finance less than one week of
response operations" (GAO, October 30, 1989, p. 18). The GAO report
stated that the Coast Guard on-scene coordinator did not authorize
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several agency activities even though reimbursement could have
been allowed under the regulatory definition of oil removal (GAO,
Draft Report, March 1991, p. 4). An example provided in the GAO
report involved the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), under the Department of Labor. OSHA incurred costs in 1989
of $191,000 to ensure that worker safety regulations were being
implemented and to prevent hazards to worker health and safety.
OSHA officials stated that the cost incurred, by bringing in twenty
additional personnel to oversee the cleanup operation fell within
"defensive actions. ..to prevent, minimize, or mitigate the threat to
public health..." as described in the National Contingency Plan. (GAO,
Draft Report, March 1991, p. 44). The GAO report stated that the on-
scene coordinator did not believe OSHA's activities were oil removal
related and, therefore, did not qualify for reimbursement through the
311(k) fund. (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 44)
The GAO report stated that the Coast Guard was not
consistent in its authorizations, as substantiated by an example
similar to OSHA's, involving the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). The FAA found it necessary to increase its staff in order to
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establish temporary air traffic control operations in the area during
the cleanup operation. In this case, the GAO points out that,
although the FAA was not involved directly in any cleanup activity,
the Coast Guard on-scene coordinator determined that this
"...involvement was necessary to facilitate the cleanup efforts" (GAO
Draft Report, March 1991, p. 44). Unlike OSHA, the FAA was reim-
bursed for the costs incurred in providing this support. (GAO,
January 26, 1990, p. 23)
Federal agencies, including DoD, had to absorb the costs into
their normal operations and/or reprogram existing funds to pay for
the expenses of spill related activities not reimbursed by Exxon or
by the Coast Guard. Some agencies did receive additional funding
from the Congress, but this did not include the Department of
Defense. (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 28)
The next section describes the costs incurred, and reported
by, the Government for the assistance provided in support of the
cleanup operation.
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D. GOVERNMENT COSTS INCURRED AND REPORTED IN
SUPPORT OF THE CLEANUP EFFORT
Table 5-1 summarizes the $152.9 million in costs reported by
the nine federal agencies as of June 30, 1990. These were the costs
reported to the GAO, not all of which were billed to Exxon for
reasons that are discussed later (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p.
22). As depicted in the table, spill related costs totaled $152.9
million, which included $116.1 million for removal, $22.6 million for
damage assessment, and $14.2 million for other costs, such as
monitoring worker safety and preparation of possible litigation.
Four agencies--the Departments of Defense, Transportation, the
Interior, and Commerce-accounted for 87 percent of the total
costs. DoD reported the highest costs--$62.2 million. (GAO Draft
Report, March 1991, p. 21)
According to a report from the Secretary of Defense's Office of
the Deputy Comptroller (ODC), Exxon has reimbursed the Government
for the entire amount of costs incurred by the United States Navy.
However, the Navy has actually received only $17.1 million in
reimbursements; the remaining $25.4 million has been retained by
the Coast Guard in the 31 1 (k) fund. (Office of the Deputy
Comptroller, OSD, December 11, 1990)
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Table 5-1
FEDERAL AGENCY COSTS (IN MILLIONS) REPORTED
THROUGH JUNE 30. 1990
Agency
Damage
Removal Assessment Other Total
Department of
Defense 62.2 0.0 0.0 62.2
Department of
Transportation 38.9 0.0 0.0 38.9
Department of
the Interior 5.4 7.1 4.6 17.1
Department of
Commerce 4.9 9.5 0.4 14.8
Environmental
Protection Agency 0.5 0.9 6.1 7.5
Department of
Agriculture 2.1 5.1 0.0 7.2
Department of
Justice 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6
Department of
Health and Human











The costs reimbursements made by Exxon for federal assistance
provided in the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation are
discussed in the next section.
E. COST REIMBURSEMENTS MADE BY EXXON
As of September 30, 1990, the Exxon Corporation had
reimbursed the Government for $114.9 million of the $152.9 million
in costs reported by the nine federal agencies. This included reim-
bursements made to the 31 1 (k) pollution fund and through direct
agreements. Table 5-2 provides a breakdown of these reimburse-
ments. (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 25)
The GAO concluded that the recovery of $30.5 million in costs
incurred was "uncertain or unlikely" for three reasons:
1. The Coast Guard or Exxon is questioning the reasonableness or
need for a particular service.
2. Exxon has not paid reimbursements for particular services
which the agencies are now pursuing through litigation.
3. Some agencies do not plan to bill Exxon for particular costs.
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Table 5-2
COSTS REIMBURSEMENTS (IN MILLIONS) MADE BY EXXON
Amount
Total Amount Amount that may
reported paid by being not be
Aaency Cost Exxon processed reimburse
Department of
Defense 62.2 56.3 0.0 5.9
Department of
Transportation 38.9 36.1 2.8 0.0
Department of
Interior 17.1 7.2 1.0 8.9
Department of
Commerce 14.8 7.3 1.6 5.9
Environmental
Protection Agency 7.5 7.1 0.0 4.4
Department of
Agriculture 7.2 4.9 0.0 2.3
Department of
Justice 2.6 0.0 0.0 2.6
Department of
Health and Human
Services 2.4 0.0 2.1 0.3
Department of
Labor 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
TOTAL 152.9 114.9 7.5 30.5
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Of the $30.5 million in cost recoveries that are uncertain, $5.9
million relates to costs incurred by the Department of Defense. In
particular, Exxon is evaluating the rates used for determining the
costs of two oil removing dredges provided by the Army Corps of
Engineers. (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, pp. 25-26)
Examples of some other unlikely recoveries include $2.6 million
incurred by the Department of Justice to prepare possible litigation
against Exxon, $0.3 million incurred by the Department of Health and
Human Services for health services provided to Native Americans
affected by the spill, and $2.3 million incurred by the Forest Service
in performing damage assessment studies (GAO Draft Report, March
1991, p. 27).
F. AGENCIES REIMBURSED BY COAST GUARD FOR LESS THAN
THE RECOVERIES RECEIVED FROM EXXON
Several agencies, including the Department of Defense, objected
to not receiving full reimbursement from the 31 1 (k) fund for the
costs incurred in the cleanup operation. Of the total $100.9 million
paid by Exxon into the pollution fund, $38.1 million, or 37.8 percent,
was retained by the Coast Guard. (Office of Deputy Comptroller, OSD,
December 11, 1990)
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Exxon is required, under the Clean Water Act, to reimburse the
Government up to the liability limit for the actual costs incurred in
the cleanup operation. However, the Act does not require the Coast
Guard to reimburse the individual agencies for the full amount
received from Exxon. The Coast Guard did not reimburse DoD, or any
of the other agencies, for what it defined as the "non-incremental
costs" paid by Exxon (Haas, 19 JUN 90). The Coast Guard expressed
that such costs should not be reimbursed between federal agencies
but should, instead, remain in the pollution fund where it would be
available for future oil spills (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 31).
The matter was forwarded to the General Accounting Office for
resolution (Haas, 19 JUN 90). The March 1991 GAO report stated
The regulations, established pursuant to the act, limit agency
reimbursements from the 31 1 (k) fund to 'reasonable amounts
not ordinarily funded by an agency's regular appropriations and
that are not incurred during normal operations'. (GAO Draft
Report, March 1991, p. 30)
The GAO report expressed that the regulations' definition of
reimbursable or incremental costs included
...those costs expended specifically on the response effort,
such as travel, overtime for civilian personnel, equipment
rentals, costs to operate vehicles, vessels, and aircraft, and
supplies and equipment used in the response effort (GAO Draft
Report, March 1991, p. 30).
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GAO staff agreed with the Coast Guard that reimbursable costs
did not include base salaries of agency personnel, or asset use
charges for government owned equipment (GAO Draft Report, March
1991, p. 31). As a result of these interpretations, the Coast Guard
reimbursed the federal agencies involved in the cleanup for only 62
percent of the costs incurred. The Department of Defense received
only $23.6 million in reimbursements, less than 42 percent of the
total costs actually incurred. The remaining $32.7 million was
retained by the Coast Guard in the 31 1 (k) fund. Table 5-3 provides a
breakdown of the reimbursements made through the 311 (k) fund and
identifies those federal agencies receiving reimbursements for less
than the costs submitted to the Coast Guard. (GAO Draft Report,
March 1991, p. 32)
G. DOD BILLING PROCEDURES FOLLOWED AND THE COSTS
INCURRED IN SUPPORT OF THE CLEANUP EFFORT
DoD tasked the Commander, Joint Task Force, Elmendorf, Alaska
(JTF-AK) to ensure that billings for DoD support were processed in a
timely manner and with adequate documentation (JTF-AK, Naval Mes-
sage, 271700Z APR 89). The Commander, JTF-AK, established DoD
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Table 5-3
REIMBURSEMENTS MADE THROUGH THE 31 1 (\Q FUND (IN MILLIONS)
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expense collection and reporting procedures in an APR 89 priority
message, which directed all DoD activities involved in the cleanup
operation
...to assure that the total cost for all actions taken in support
of the Alaska oil spill cleanup are documented in a manner
which will facilitate accurate billing and validation by
followup audit. This includes maintaining logs, as needed, to
capture both full and incremental cost. We anticipate that a
majority of DoD expenses will be reimbursed through the














As the message indicates, DoD expected the 31 1 (k) fund to be
used to provide restitution, even though the Coast Guard did not
officially inform DoD of such an intention until the following month.
The message also provided explanations of reimbursable costs as
defined in the Clean Water Act and stated that reimbursable costs
would include those which the Coast Guard
...found to be reasonable and as a result of removal activity and
that are not ordinarily funded by an agency's regular
appropriations and that are not incurred during normal
operations. (JTF-AK, Naval Message, 271700Z, APR89, p. 3)
As instructed by the CNO
,
JTF-AK directed all commands involved to
submit bi-weekly summary reports, with the reporting period ending
on the Friday of the second week (CNO, Administrative Message,
121815Z MAY 89). Commands were required to report in a format
that broke down costs by line item, to describe the total dollars by
specific appropriation, and to show the basis for calculating the
cost (e.g., travel order, purchase order, standard cost manual). When
cost factors were used, JTF-AK directed that commands provide
input at non-DoD and DoD rates. (JTF-AK, Naval Message, 271700Z,
APR 89, p. 3) An example provided in the guidance dealt with air-
craft support.
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Cost--$25,000. Five hours flown mission 45XYZ at a cost of
$5,000/hour. Cost Basis: Air Force Regulation (AFR) XXX-Y,
table KK, non-DoD rate. Cost would be XX,XXX if charged at DoD
rate. (JTF-AK,Naval Message, 271700Z, APR 89, p. 4)
After the commands submitted their reports on expenditures,
the JTF-AK command would consolidate and coordinate the reported
DoD costs with the Coast Guard's on-scene coordinator for reim-
bursement purposes. The JTF-AK would then advise the DoD activ-
ities on billing procedures for services that had been approved as
charges to the 31 1 (k) fund. (JTF-AK, Naval Message, 271700Z, APR
89, p. 3) Following this direction, the DoD commands which par-
ticipated in the cleanup operation reported costs totalling $62.2
million. Table 5-4 provides a breakdown, by Service, of the DoD
costs reported as of June 30, 1990. (Telephone Conversation with
ODC, Management Systems, December 11, 1990 report).
Of the three Departments within the DoD that provided
assistance (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the United States Navy
submitted billings for $42.5 million or 68 percent of the total costs
incurred by DoD. The Navy provided barrack ships which were used to
house cleanup crews and to support cleanup activities on nearby
beaches. The Navy also provided oil skimmers, booms, tow boats,
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Engineers) 10.4 4.5 5.9 0.0 4.5 5.9
Aeromedical
Evacuation 1.4 1 .4 0.0 0.0 1 .4 0.0
Oil Spotting 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
Crisis Center 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4
ARMY TOTAL 13.4 7.5 5.9 0.4 7.1 6.3
NAVY
Skimmers-Operations 7.7 7.7 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0
Skimmer-Rentals 10.1 10.1 0.0 7.0 3.1 7.0
Barracks Ships 24.0 24.0 0.0 18.4 5.6 18.4
Mechanized Landing
Craft 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
NAVY TOTAL 42.5 42.5 0.0 25.4 17.1 25.4
AIR FORCE
MAC Flights 3.7 3.7 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0
Decontamination Units 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0
Crisis Center Ops 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.9
AIR FORCE TOTAL 6.3 6.3 0.0 0.9 5.4 0.9
DoD TOTAL 62.2 56.3 5.9 26.7 29.6 32.6
other equipment, and personnel necessary to support the removal of
oil from the water and shorelines. The Navy billings also included
charges for costs incurred by the United States Marine Corp in
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providing flight services. These charges are discussed in detail in
Section H(3).
As shown in Table 5-4, the Navy received the lowest percentage
of reimbursements among the Departments, recouping only 40 per-
cent of the costs incurred in providing support. This reimbursement
deficiency resulted from disagreements with the Coast Guard over
what constituted reimbursable costs and not from Exxon's failure to
make payments to the 31 1(k) fund. (Mizuo, telephone conversation,
January 24, 1991)
The next section reviews some of the procedures followed by
the Navy in determining the costs to bill Exxon for services provided.
H. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES NAVY SUPPORT FOR THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL CLEANUP OPERATION
In accordance with CNO guidance, based on NAVCOMPT Manual,
Volume 3, paragraph 035875, billings to the Coast Guard totalled
$42.5 million (CNO Naval Message, 121815Z MAY 89 and CINCPACFLT
Naval Message, 2401 31 Z FEB 90). For purposes of comparison and
review, the charges for the Navy assistance provided during the
cleanup effort are organized into categories which are different
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from the four presented in the table. These are, (1) skimmer rental
costs, (2) amphibious ships barracks costs, (3) flight operations
costs, and (4) mechanized landing crafts lease. The cost accounting
and billing procedures followed for each of these is examined in the
following subsections.
1 . Skimmers Rental and Accessory Equipment Costs
The Navy provided MARCO Class V and Class XI Oil Skimmers
and MONARK 24' tow boats to assist in the removal of oil from the
water and shorelines (GAO, January 26, 1990, p. 11). Skimmer rental
rates were charged at commercial rental rates but capped at the
acquisition costs (DoD Comptroller Invoice Number 89-97-015).
During the billing process, Exxon expressed dissatisfaction with the
rental rates charged by the Navy. In order to resolve the issue, the
Navy agreed to search the private sector for commercially
comparable equipment and to gather rental and lease cost data for
comparison with Navy rates. (Office of the Comptroller, Department
of the Navy, November 8, 1989) Based on the study, the rental rates
issue was resolved, with Exxon reimbursing the Coast Guard
$10,057,972. This was the full amount submitted by CINCPACFLT in
billings to the Coast Guard. (Haas, 19 JUN 1990).
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Although Exxon reimbursed the Coast Guard for the entire
amount as of December 11, 1990, the Navy received only $3.1
million. The Coast Guard retained the remaining $7.0 million in the
311(k) fund. (Office of Deputy Comptroller, OSD, December 11, 1990)
2. Amphibious Ships Barracks
The Navy provided two LSD's (Landing Ship Docks) and four
LPD's (Landing Platform Docks), which housed cleanup crews and
supported cleanup activities on nearby beaches. These ships included
USS OGDEN (LPD 5), USS DULUTH (LPD 6), USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7),
USS JUNEAU (LPD 10), USS MT VERNON (LSD 39), and USS FT MCHENRY
(LSD 43). (CINCPACFLT Comptroller, File RATE_REV.WK1)
In providing cost reporting guidance to COMNAVSURFPAC,
CINCPACFLT divided the costs involved in providing ship's support
into five categories: (1) Military Personnel Costs (2) Maintenance
Costs-Emergent Repair, Intermediate Repair (IMA), and Phased Main-
tenance Availability (PMA), (3) Steaming Costs, (4) Other Costs, and
(5) Exxon Support. (CINCPACFLT, Naval Message, 142246Z, JUL 89)
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a. Military Personnel Costs
Military personnel costs for both officers and enlisted
were computed by CINCPACFLT based on (1) the number of days on
scene and in transit reported by COMNAVSURFPAC, (2) number of
personnel on board ship, and (3) rates from the Composite Standard
Military Rate (CSMR) in NAVCOMPT Note 7041 dated 8 December
1988 (Mizuo, April 29, 1991). CINCPACFLT submitted billings to the
Coast Guard for $2,308,080 for Navy Officer Personnel expenses, and
$14,818,795 for Navy enlisted personnel expenses, for a total of
$17,126,875 (CINCPACFLT, Naval Message, 240131Z FEB 90). As
directed in the NAVCOMPT Manual, paragraph 035750, acceleration
factors were applied to the CMSR provided in NAVCOMPT Note 7041.
This included a 14 percent "leave and holiday accrual" for both
officers and enlisted, as well as an "other personnel support costs
accrual" of 6 percent for officers and 18 percent for enlisted
(CINCPACFLT, File Name MPN_REV3, 17 AUG 89).
b. Emergent Repair, Intermediate Repair, and PMA
CINCPACFLT used daily rates developed by NAVCOMPT
(NCB-1) for each of these Ship's maintenance expenses. An asset use
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rate was also employed. Table 5-5 describes the various rates used
for the six ships providing assistance. (Mizuo, April 29, 1991)
CINCPACFLT calculated maintenance and asset use costs by
multiplying maintenance and asset use rates by the number of on
scene days reported by COMNAVSURFPAC. These rates were not
applied to days required in transiting to and from the scene.
Table 5-5
SCHEDULE OF DAILY SHIP MAINTENANCE AND ASSET USE RATES
Emergent Asset
Ship Repair IMA PMA Use Charge
USS JUNEAU 2,312 948 9,600 2,516
USS FT MC HENRY 1,877 1,003 9,600 22,629
USS CLEVELAND 2,660 1,123 9,600 2,291
USS MT VERNON 1,877 1,003 9,600 1,946
USSOGDEN 3,449 1,003 1,208 2,880
USS DULUTH 3,449 1,003 1,208 3,155
c. Steaming Costs
CINCPACFLT directed COMNAVSURFPAC to report "actual
barrels of fuel consumed by type, and further categorized by tran-
siting to scene, on scene, and transiting from scene". Ships were
also directed to report the actual incremental OPTAR (operating
target) costs incurred in direct support of the cleanup operation.
(CINCPACFLT, Naval Message, 142246Z, JUL 89)
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d. Other Costs
CINCPACFLT guidance defined "other costs" as tem-
porary additional duty, repair parts, and other actual costs incurred
in direct support of the cleanup operation (CINCPACFLT, Naval
Message, 142246Z JUL 89).
e. Exxon Support
CINCPACFLT directed all commands to report the type,
amount, and estimated value of food, supplies, parts, and personnel,
as well as the number of barrels of fuel provided by Exxon at no
charge to the Navy. In determining billings, CINCPACFLT deducted
the amount of "free fuel" and other support items provided by Exxon
from the total amount used by the ships during the operation.
f. Disagreements Over Criteria Used in Billing for
Ship's Operations
The charges computed by CINCPACFLT for amphibious
ship's support were directly affected by the number of days reported
as associated with the cleanup effort. The issue of billing policy
concerning transit time (time required for ships to travel to and
from the cleanup site) became a point of controversy between DoD
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and Exxon. On November 7, 1989, several billing issues were raised
by Exxon in a meeting with representatives from the military
departments involved (Office of the Comptroller, Department of the
Navy, November 8, 1989). Exxon agreed that charging for transit time
was appropriate but proposed three issues that it felt warranted
consideration of recosting. First, Exxon questioned why DoD was
billing for transit time in and out for all six ships used in the
cleanup effort, when Exxon's original request had been for only two
ships, the same two ships, to remain in the cleanup area for the
duration. The Navy used six ships, rotating on a 56 day cycle, rather
than the same two ships. The second issue involved disagreement
over the actual transit time required to travel to and from the area.
Exxon proposed that the two ships required only 14 days in, and
perhaps 13 days out, for a total of 27 days. The Navy, on the other
hand, argued that the six ships required transit time in of 38 days,
and transit time out of 43 days, for a total transit time of 81 days.
The third issue involved Exxon's contention that transit time should
be viewed as "common costs" since "the crew could be going through
the same training exercises whether the ship was headed to the
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cleanup area or deployed on a Navy related mission". (Office of the
Comptroller, Department of the Navy, November 8, 1989)
NAVCOMPT had provided COMNAVSURFPAC with transit
time reporting guidance earlier in an administrative message sent
out by CINCPACFLT, dated 142246Z JUL 89. NAVCOMPT defined three
parameters for reporting transit time required in the cleanup effort:
1
.
If ship was at home port before being deployed to Valdez,
time spent getting to and from scene is chargeable transit
time.
2. If ship was at sea, time spent getting to scene is charge-
able transit time.
3. If ship was at sea and involved in an exercise, time spent
getting to scene is chargeable transit time. If another ship
was ordered to replace the first ship, time spent getting
to the exercise by second ship is also chargeable transit
time.
The parameters described above reflect the procedures
followed by CINCPACFLT, as evidenced by examination of the billings
submitted. For the six ships involved in the cleanup operation, the
average transit time in was 6.3 days, the average days on scene was
37.3 days, and the average transit time out was 7.1 days.
CINCPACFLT billed Exxon for the transit time actually reported by
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the individual ships, and billings could not be found which suggested
the use of any other costing method. (CINCPACFLT, File Name RATE_
REV.WK1)
3. Flight Operations
In billings submitted to the Coast Guard, CINCPACFLT
included charges of $1,588,176 for the costs of flight services
provided by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (CG
FMFPAC) (CINCPACFLT, File Name SPECIAL.WK1). The FMFPAC Comp-
troller derived flight costs using actual flying hour data and the OP-
20 flying hour cost report for the KC130 transports and CH46
helicopters used during the cleanup operation. The FMFPAC logged
157.3 flight hours in the KC130 transport, and 948.3 flight hours in
the CH46 helicopter, for a total of 1105.6 flight hours devoted to
support of the cleanup effort. A total of 122 officers and 161
enlisted personnel made up the flight crews for the two types of
aircraft. CINCPACFLT calculated Marine personnel costs by using the
flight hours reported by FMFPAC multiplied by the CSMR provided in
NAVCOMPT Note 7041, dated 8 December 1988. The same
acceleration factors used in deriving the Navy personnel costs (leave
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and holiday and other personnel support costs factors) were also
used by CINCPACFLT in deriving the Marine military personnel costs.
Using these methods, the Marine personnel billings totalled
$497,407, which included $344,386 for officers and $153,021 for
enlisted personnel. The remaining $1,060,769 of costs reported by
FMFPAC included OM&N costs, including fuel consumed, temporary ad
ditional duty, depot level repair, oil and lubricants, and other OPTAR
costs. (CG FMFPAC, Naval Message, 160213Z OCT 89)
4. Lease of Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM)
In a lease agreement dated July 28, 1989, Exxon hired four
LCM-8 landing crafts, twelve LCM-6 landing crafts, and one service
waste oil barge (SWOB 049) for use in the cleanup operation.
Through negotiations with the Coast Guard and COMNAVSURFPAC,
Exxon agreed to pay $560 per day for each LCM-6, $814 per day for
each LCM-8, and $2,000 per day for SWOB 049. The agreement was to
cover an initial period of sixty days, after which the lease would
continue on a day-to-day basis at the established daily rental rate
and "...until the vessels are redelivered" (Lease Agreement between
United States of America and Exxon, July 28, 1989). Exxon provided
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the operating crews for the vessels with the lease stipulating that
The Lessee shall be solely liable and shall hold harmless and
defend the Government against any and all costs, expenses and
liabilities arising with regard to the vessel(s)... (Lease
Agreement between United States of America and Exxon, July
28, 1989, paragraph 7, p. 3)
Exxon rented the LCM's and SWOB from 28 July 1989 to 25
September 1989, for which CINCPACFLT submitted a bill of
$718,560 (CINCPACFLT, Military Interdepartmental Purchase
Request, 06 Feb 90). Although the lease billing period was concluded
on the 25th of September, redelivery of the landing crafts did not
take place until late January, 1990. Paragraph 6(a) required the
lessee to restore the landing crafts to overhaul condition, "including
overhaul of all equipment to as good order and condition as when the
vessel(s) was received...." Paragraph 6(b) stipulated that
Lessee agrees to restore the vessel(s) for any maintenance or
repair of significant damage to the vessel(s) during operations
related to the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill cleanup effort...
Since the lease agreement stated that the rental terms
would continue until the vessels were redelivered, CINCPACFLT
continued documentation and recording of charges through January
26, 1990, which resulted in accumulated charges of $2,143,704
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(CINCPACFLT, File name: SPECIALWK1). Although Exxon did, indeed,
have possession of the landing crafts until late January of 1990, it
was not charged for the additional days as a result of changes
brought about by one of the three amendments later made to the
original lease agreement. Amendment Number One, dated November 2,
1989, implemented the obligations of Exxon to repair the landing
crafts as stipulated under Paragraph 6(b) of the original lease.
Amendment One also revised the July 28th lease by stipulating that
"Exxon's obligation to pay charter hire for the landing craft has
ceased as of September 25, 1989". In addition, the Amendment listed
the repairs to be made at Exxon's sole cost, plus the repair materials
that would be provided by the Navy at no cost to Exxon. Redelivery
of the landing craft was to take place only after both the Navy Port
Engineer, and the Exxon representative were satisfied that the
landing craft were "fully mission capable". In compliance with the
revisions described, CINCPACFLT deducted $1,425,144 from the ac-
cumulated charges, and submitted $718,560 in charges to the Coast
Guard on March 13, 1990 (CINCPACFLT, File Name SPECIAL.WK1).
Amendment Number Two, dated March 17, 1990, listed additional
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repair materials that would be provided by the Navy. Amendment
Number Three, dated June 12, 1990, affirmed that Exxon had
performed all its obligations, including "payment in full of all
amounts to be paid under the lease."
I. SUMMARY
The size of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and its potential threat to
the environment required an extensive cleanup operation involving
ten federal agencies providing a wide variety of services. The GAO
review of the cleanup effort pointed out the difficulties that can
result from such an undertaking when there is a lack of clear and
definitive guidance regarding the reimbursement process. In
particular, the GAO report stated that "without applicable standards
for developing spill related charges, agencies used a variety of
different methods to develop their bills" (GAO Draft Report, March
1991, p. 55). As a result, GAO auditors discovered several incon-
sistencies in the cost accounting, reporting, and billing procedures
followed by the federal agencies that were involved in the cleanup
operation.
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Due in part to the issues raised in the GAO review of the Valdez
spill, Congress enacted in August of 1990 The Oil Pollution Act of
1990. This new Act addresses many of the problems that limited
reimbursements in the Exxon Valdez cleanup operation, by expanding
upon the definition of reimbursable activities. Specifically, the act
establishes an Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund which authorizes
agencies to recoup up to $500 million for damage assessment and
restoration costs incurred in each cleanup operation. (GAO Draft
Report, March 1991, p. 4) However, the GAO report advised that, in
establishing regulations to implement the Act, the Coast Guard
should provide (1) a broad range of authorized cleanup activities, (2)
procedures for the quick notification of agencies of the reim-
bursement process to be employed, and (3) guidance or policies
which clarify standards and methods to be use in computing and
recovering costs from the fund. (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 5)
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COST REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN ASSESSING PARAMOUNT
PICTURES AND EXXON FOR DOD ASSISTANCE PROVIDED
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the similarities and dissimilarities that
exist in the policies governing the billing practices followed by DoD
in charging the Paramount Pictures Corporation and the Exxon Cor-
poration for the services provided to each. Offered first is a review
of the use of written agreements, followed by an examination of the
billing policies governing each case. This includes a review of the
billing procedures prescribed under each policy with a focus on the
inconsistencies in their implementation. The chapter concludes with
an examination of possible justifications for the differences found
in DoD reimbursement criteria, as well as a brief review of billing




Although the purposes for the DoD assistance provided in each
case are unique, the types of resources used are the same (i.e., ships,
aircraft and personnel). Differences in the prescribed treatment of
costs exist in DoD policies and/or Government regulations coverning
the three instances examined in this thesis. In addition to these
differences in policy, each case also demonstrates inconsistencies
in policy implementation.
C. WRITTEN AGREEMENTS
DoD does not consistently require the use of written agreements
when providing assistance to private organizations. In DODINST
5410.16, dated January 26, 1988, DoD requires the military services
to negotiate a written agreement with the motion picture or
television producer prior to providing assistance in a commercial
production. This "Reimbursement Agreement" must include a de-
tailed description of the services to be provided and the estimated
cost to be incurred by the Government. In addition, the agreement
requires the producer to abide by DODINST 5410.16 which, in part,
describes what types of assistance require reimbursement.
(DODINST 5410.16, JANUARY 26, 1988)
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In order to avoid many of the conflicts experienced in previous
involvements with the entertainment industry, DoD clarified costing
methods and provided specific billing guidelines through the im-
plementation of the 1988 DODINST 5410.16. As a result of the
revisions, many of the disagreements experienced in the Top Gun and
Final Countdown productions did not recur in DoD's next major
involvement with the entertainment industry, the production of The
Hunt for Red October. This, however, may not have been due to the
use of a Reimbursement Agreement, but instead due to the additional
billing guidance provided in the DoD instruction. A member of the
NAVINFO West staff stated that, "A Reimbursement Agreement was
not required in The Hunt for Red October production since Paramount
Pictures had established an adequate letter of credit." (NAVINFO
West, February 21, 1991). Neither NAVINFO West nor CHINFO could
provide the author with a Reimbursement Agreement covering DoD's
involvement in that particular production. As a matter of fact,
Paramount Pictures established Letters of Credit and Hold Harmless
agreements for both Top Gun and The Hunt for Red October pro-
ductions, although such agreements were not specifically required
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by DoD instuction until incorporated into the revised DODINST
5410.16 - after the Top Gun production.
Contracts, like the Reimbursement Agreement, were not
required by the Federal Government when DoD and the other federal
agencies provided assistance to the Exxon Corporation in 1989.
Many of the same difficulties encountered in the Top Gun production
were also experienced in the Exxon Valdez cleanup operation. These
included (1) the lack of clearly defined billing criteria, (2) the use
of a wide variety of costing methods by the DoD components
involved, and (3) disagreements over the reimbursement criteria (i.e,
full versus incremental costs). In the Exxon Valdez cleanup, the
Clean Water Act and the National Contingency Plan could be viewed
as a type of Reimbursement Agreement, and the 31 1 (k) fund as a
type of letter of credit, although both do not achieve the same
reimbursement assurances as those used in DoD dealings with the
entertainment industry. The Clean Water Act and the National
Contingency Plan provide predesignated roles and coordinated plans
for immediate response to a major oil spill, but they do not provide
specific criteria and procedures for determining and calculating
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charges to bill the organization responsible for the spill. There was
confusion among the agencies involved in the Exxon Valdez cleanup
effort as to what reporting and billing procedures were to be
followed. The March 1991 GAO report stated that this confusion was
the result of the Coast Guard's failure to provide specific billing
guidance and, in some cases, failure to simply notify agencies that
the 31 1 (k) fund was actually going to be used, until weeks after the
cleanup operation had began (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 51).
Participating DoD components "anticipated" that a majority of their
expenses would be reimbursed through the pollution fund (JTF-AK
Elmendorf, 271700Z APR 89). Most of the charges submitted by DoD
were reimbursed, but not all. The lack of detailed, pre-service,
agreements and specific billing guidance resulted in disagreements
with the Coast Guard over reimbursement criteria, as well as what
activities qualified for reimbursement under the Clean Water Act
and/or the National Contingency Plan.
The absence of clear guidance and agency unfamiliarity with
billing procedures for this type of assistance resulted in millions of
dollars of under and over billed charges to Exxon. Examples include
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the failure of several agencies to bill for asset use charges and full
retirement costs for personnel involved in the cleanup effort. These
expenses are discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. The
lack of agreements similar to the Reimbursement Agreement
required by DoD in dealings with the entertainment industry con-
tributed to DoD's recoupment of less than 42 percent of the cost
incurred in the Exxon Valdez cleanup operation.
Although the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 attempts to curtail such
problems in future oil spills, a determining factor will be the
wording of its implementing regulations, which the Coast Guard is
currently in the process of preparing. The immediate action required
in response to a major oil spill prevents case by case preparation of
written agreements with the responsible spiller prior to providing
the necessary cleanup and containment activities. However,
regulations can be implemented which specify the reporting, billing,




With respect to the policies governing reimbursement for ser-
vices provided to a private party, differences exist as to the costs
that are to be recovered. Table 6-1 provides a summary of the main
differences in reimbursement policy found among the three cases
examined.
Table 6-1
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Federal User Rate











Asset Use Charges 4% of Direct Costs None 4% of Direct Costs
Administrative
Surcharges
3% of Total Costs 3% of Total Costs 3% of Total Costs
Differences in DoD reimbursement policy are demonstrated when
examing DODINST 5410.16 and DODINST 7230.7. While DODINST
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5410.16 calls for recoupment for any "additional costs" incurred as
a result of assistance rendered, DODINST 7230.7 calls for either the
recovery of the "full cost" incurred by the Federal Government, or
the fair market value, whichever is higher. Section III of the
NAVCOMPT manual, entitled Private Parties, calls for similar
recoupment of the "full cost incurred by the Department of the
Navy..." (NAVCOMPT Manual 035875 (b)1).
Differences in billing procedures arose from the different
definitions of the costs to be recouped and from the selective
employment of guidelines from different instructions. These dif-
ferences are highlighted when comparing the costing methods and
billing criteria used by DoD in the dealings with Paramount Pictures
with those followed in DoD's involvement with Exxon.
Had DoD not implemented changes in cost reimbursement
policy through revision of DODINST 5410.16, Paramount Pictures
would have been assessed a greater amount of charges for the
services provided in The Hunt for Red October production. The cost
reimbursement policy followed in the Exxon Valdez case, which was
similar to that used in the Top Gun production, required
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reimbursements from Exxon for amounts greater than would have
been assessed had the billing policy been similar to that followed in
The Hunt for Red October production.
The following is a comparison of the billing procedures used to
derive charges as prescribed under the three policies. In particular,
three major cost categories are examined: (1) Military and Civilian
Personnel Costs, (2) Aircraft, Ship, and Other Military Equipment
Costs, and (3) Asset Usage/Administrative Surcharges.
1 . Military and Civilian Personnel Costs
Revision of DODINST 5410.16 introduced a major shift in
DoD policy regarding reimbursement for military and civilian
personnel costs incurred in providing production assistance to the
entertainment industry. In the Top Gun production, DoD policy re-
quired Paramount Pictures to reimburse the Navy for all personnel
expenses incurred. This included charges for the salaries of flight
crews; services such as towing aircraft, dearming ejection seats,
and rigging the flightdeck barricade; as well as civilian personnel
costs for orientation briefings and time spent in meetings and
telephone conversations. CINCPACFLT used the CSMR, adjusted by the
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"leave and holiday" and "other personnel support cost" acceleration
factors to recover the full cost incurred by the government.
For military and civilian personnel costs incurred during
The Hunt for Red October production, CINCPACFLT charged Paramount
Pictures for civilian overtime charges only. This was in accordance
with the policy prescribed in the revised DODINST 5410.16 which
mandates that the production company is not required to reimburse
the Government for military or civilian personnel, when "such
personnel are officially assigned to assist in the production." The
author was unable to obtain, from any of the DoD commands con-
tacted, a clarification of who was considered "officially assigned"
or what method of assignment was required (i.e., written orders for
specific individuals, verbal orders to DoD components by NAVINFO or
CHINFO). Under this clause, CINCPACFLT did not bill Paramount
Pictures for the hours devoted to the production by NAVINFO and
CHINFO personnel or for the hours contributed by the staffs of the
Comptroller and PAO offices involved. In addition, CINCPACFLT did
not submit billings for services such as the background checks
performed by the Naval Intelligence Service or for the
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aviation/swim physiology classes required for the cast and filming
crews who would embark in military helicopters. Such costs could
be considered "additional expenses incurred as a result of assistance
rendered," but the personnel providing these types of services were
considered "officially assigned to the production."
A policy similar to that governing billing procedures used in
the Top Gun production was also followed in billing Exxon for the
military and civilian personnel costs incurred in the Exxon Valdez
cleanup operation. In both cases, CINCPACFLT used the CSMR from
the applicable NAVCOMPT Note 7041 and adjusted the rates by the
same acceleration factors: 14 percent leave and holiday rate for
both officers and enlisted and the other personnel support costs
rates of 6 percent for officers and 18 percent for enlisted.
However, in the Exxon Valdez case, the GAO report points out that
there were inconsistencies among the federal agencies in the
implementation of policy with respect to the application of these
acceleration factors. For example, the Coast Guard did not include
adjustments for retirement costs, and both the Department of the
Interior and the FAA did not include adjustments for leave and
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holiday accruals (GAO Draft Report, March 1991). In accordance with
the applicable NAVCOMPT Note 7041, the CINCPACFLT Comptroller
considered the retirement rate to already be incorporated in the
CSMR and applied acceleration factors to recoup leave and holiday
and other personnel support cost (CINCPACFLT, File Name MPN_REV3,
17 AUG 89).
Another difference between the policy followed in the Top
Gun production and that followed in the Exxon Valdez operation was
in the methods prescribed to report and assess charges for personnel
support. Billing guidance in the Top Gun production required com-
mands to report the particular service performed, as well as the
time required in minutes. This provided an accurate measure of the
costs incurred as a direct result of rendering a service to that
organization. In the Exxon Valdez case, CINCPACFLT billed Exxon,
using a daily charge derived for each rate/rank, for every member
aboard ship, regardless of the particular duties performed. This
included charges for military personnel who performed services not
directly related to the cleanup effort. For example, CINCPACFLT
included in its billings charges for services performed by a ship's
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Mess Specialists (cooks), Engineermen (responsible for such things
as the repair and upkeep of auxiliary equipment, air conditioning
systems, and diesel engines), Electrician Mates, and ship's
Servicemen (barbers, ship's store and laundry personnel).
CINCPACFLT calculated military and civilian personnel
costs by multiplying the daily rates by the number of days reported
as transit time and days on scene. As mentioned earlier, this policy
was an area of contention between DoD and Exxon. Exxon expressed
concern that some consideration should be given to recosting
charges for transit time, since many of the expenses incurred could
be viewed as common costs. Many of the types of personnel costs
described above would be incurred by DoD whether the ship was
involved in an oil cleanup operation off the coast of Alaska or
deployed elsewhere. In fact, the Navy would incur many of the same
personnel costs if the ships were in port. In addition, the Navy
conducted military training exercises in conjunction with the
cleanup effort. This included exercises such as General Quarters,
Man Overboard drills, and fire fighting training. However, no billing
adjustments were made in consideration of these common costs.
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The policy of charging Exxon for all personnel costs, based
on both the days spent in transit and on scene, is also in sharp
contrast to the policy followed in billing for flight services
provided to Paramount Pictures in The Hunt for Red October pro-
duction. In that production DoD required commands to charge for all
flight hours devoted to the production, "except when such missions
coincide with and can be considered legitimate operational and
training missions" (DODINST 5410.16 E4(b), January 26, 1988).
Paramount Pictures was not billed in all cases for flight hours log-
ged in ferrying aircraft to a filming location, since some military
training was accomplished during the transit (i.e., low level and air
combat training exercises). Exxon, in effect, was arguing for a
similar policy implementation with respect to ship operations.
Although DoD billing guidance calls for recoupment of only those
additional expenses incurred in rendering services to the
entertainment industry, in the Exxon Valdez case DoD required full
reimbursement of the costs incurred without any consideration of
the distinction between "common" and "additional" cost.
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2. Aircraft, Ship, And Other Military Equipment Costs
a. Charges for the Use of Aircraft
In order to avoid flight hour billing disagreements with
the entertainment industry, like those encountered in the Top Gun
and Final Countdown productions, DoD introduced policy revisions in
the1988 DODINST 5410.16. Although this instruction clarifies
which actual flight hours require reimbursement, it does not provide
procedures for the pricing of these services. That responsibility is
left to the Services and is sometimes further delegated to the
individual activities providing those flight hours.
Flight hour rates were derived on a case by case basis,
and this resulted in a variety of user rates, as well as a lack of
standardization among the Services. Personnel from both the
COMNAVAIRPAC and CINCPACFLT Comptroller Offices stressed the
need for established standard reimbursement rates similar to those
already provided in the NAVCOMPT Manual for various types of
military helicopters. NAVCOMPT Manual 035882 provides three
categories of flying hour reimbursement rates:
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1.
A DoD User Rate, used for billing other DoD components. The
rate is derived to recoup expenses for petroleum, oil, lubri-
cants, depot maintenance, supplies, replenishment spares, and
civilian pay.
2. A Non-DoD/Other Federal User Rate, used for billing U.S.
Government agencies outside DoD. The rate includes the DoD
rate plus military pay and permanent change of station costs.
3. A FMS(Foreign Military Sales)/Non-Government User Rate used
for billing non-government users. The rate includes the items
covered by the previous two rates plus an asset use charge and
a general and administrative surcharge.
Policy governing the flight hour rates for the types of
aircraft used in the Top Gun production resulted in rates similar to
the FMS/Non-Government Rate for helicopters in that they include
charges for military pay, an asset use charge, and an administrative
surcharge. Policy followed by COMNAVAIRPAC in The Hunt for Red
October production resulted in derived rates similar to the DoD User
Rate in that the flight hour rates include charges for fuel and depot
level repairables. Military pay was excluded in accordance with the
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revised DODINST 5410.16. In effect, the Navy billed Paramount
Pictures for flight services provided in The Hunt for Red October at
a rate less than it would charge for similar services provided to a
U.S. Government agency outside DoD if billing was in accordance
with the guidelines established in NAVCOMPT Manual 035882.
Although an actual rate per flying hour was not applied
in the Exxon Valdez case, the policy followed by the Commanding
General, FMFPAC resulted in assessed charges similar to those that
would have been derived had the Non-DoD/Other Federal User Rate
been used. Costs for military pay were reimbursed as well as
charges for fuel, oil, and depot level repairs. Asset use and
administrative surcharges were not identified in the billings
examined. Personnel from the FMFPAC Comptroller Office were
unable to confirm whether such charges were included.
Justification for the differences in policy concerning
the costs billed to these two private parties for the same types of
flight services was not found.
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b. Charges for the Use of Ships and other Naval
Vessels
The policies coverning the use of Naval vessels in all
three cases are similar in that each required reimbursement for
such costs as fuel, oil, and maintenance. Although the Navy did not
assess Paramount Pictures for any ship operations during the Top
Gun production, reimbursement criteria prescribed in the applicable
policy were similar to those followed in the other two cases.
However, one difference in policy does exist among the three cases
which is the result of the variances discussed earlier regarding the
treatment of military and civilian personnel costs. DoD policy
required that the rates used in the Exxon Valdez case also include
charges for all personnel costs incurred. (This billing procedure is
discussed in more detail later in the section.)
Several inconsistencies were discovered in the imple-
mentaion of policy governing ships' support provided in The Hunt for
Red October production. These inconsistencies appeared to result
from the lack of established billing procedures. This became evident
when seeking information concerning the reimbursements requested
for this type of assistance. None of the staff who were contacted at
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the commands contributing to The Hunt for Red October production,
including the Comptroller and Public Affairs Offices, could explain
who was responsible for deriving the hourly rates used or how they
were calculated. Those contacted did report that, in accordance with
guidance provided in DODINST 5410.16, charges included only fuel
and maintenance expenses, and not military personnel costs.
Regarding the use of nuclear submarines in The Hunt for
Red October production, a staff member of NAVINFO West explained
that the $397 per hour rate was based on the yearly costs derived by
dividing the acquisition cost of the nuclear reactors aboard by their
estimated useful life. A staff member of COMSUBTRAFAC, on the
other hand, reported that the rate was derived to recoup the costs of
the fuel, oil, lubricants, and general maintenance required on the
submarines. Personnel from the COMSUBPAC Comptroller Office were
unable to confirm which billing procedures were followed.
A variety of rates were also used by the commands
providing tugboat services in The Hunt for Red October production.
For tugboats of the same type (i.e., engine size, tonnage), hourly
rates ranged from the $225 charged by Naval Station Long Beach to
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the $52.50 charged by the Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering
Command. Staff at some of the commands reported that their rates
were developed to recover the costs of fuel and oil consumed, while
others reported that their rates were based on the expenses incurred
as a result of hiring a civilian tugboat to replace the Navy tugs used
in the production. None of the staff at the commands contacted were
aware of the formula provided in NAVCOMPT Manual 035881 for
deriving rental rates for Navy tugboats, or whether or not this
formula had been used by the personnel computing the charges.
Examination of the billing guidance provided by NAVINFO West,
CHINFO, and CINCPACFLT during the production made no reference to
this formula.
Although DoD has established policy covering the
reimbursement for these types of services, the inconsistencies in
policy implementation suggest a need for additional DoD billing
guidance and procedures in order to curtail such inconsistencies.
Another example of inconsistent implementation of
policy was found in the Exxon Valdez case. DoD submitted billings
to recover the full costs of the ships' support provided. This in-
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eluded charges ranging from $17,126,875.00 for military personnel
to $372.00 for laundry equipment repairs. The charges for military
personnel were based on the number of days spent in transit and on
scene. However, charges for the three types of maintenance costs
were tabulated by multiplying the daily rates, derived by the Office
of the Comptroller of the Navy, by the number of on-scene days only.
None of the commands contacted, including CINCPACFLT and the Navy
Comptroller, could explain why these same rates were not also
applied to the days in transit.
3. Asset Use and Administrative Surcharges
Both DODINST 7230.7 and the NAVCOMPT Manual (paragraph
035875) provide policies requiring an asset usage charge to cover
depreciation and interest on investment in DoD owned fixed assets.
The NAVCOMPT Manual prescribes the specific rate of four percent
of direct costs, while the DoD instruction refers to the current
annual rate provided in OMB Circular Number A-94.
In accordance with DoD policy, CINCPACFLT charged Para-
mount Pictures an asset use charge for the aircraft, forklifts, and
other equipment used in the Top Gun production. However, a GAO
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audit reported that this billing practice was not applied con-
sistently in that an asset use charge was not applied to Navy
cameras used in the production (Inspector General, 1986).
In accordance with the policy applicable to The Hunt for Red
October production, CINCPACFLT did not charge Paramount Pictures
an asset use charge; such charges were prohibited under guidance
prescribed in the January 21, 1988 DODINST 5410.16.
In contrast, policy governing the Exxon Valdez case resulted
in asset use charges of $1,290,221 for the six FFG's used in the
cleanup operation. The daily asset use rate derived by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Navy was applied only for those days reported
as on scene. The author was unable to obtain reasons why the asset
use rate was not also applied to days in transit.
Regarding policy governing asset use charges, the GAO
refers to several sources of guidance in its March 1991 report on the
Exxon Valdez cleanup operation. The report states that, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-25, User Charges, "...federal
agencies should recover their costs for services or benefits they
provide to recipients, including depreciation of equipment."
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The policies are similar with respect to the use of
administrative surcharges when examining each of the three cases.
However, inconsistencies in the implementation of these policies
were found.
In accordance with NAVCOMPT Manual 035875, paragraph
1b(2), CINCPACFLT assessed Paramount pictures an administrative
surcharge of $3,281.63, or 3 percent of total costs for the as-
sistance provided in the Top Gun production. This same billing
policy was applied in The Hunt for Red October production, with
CINCPACFLT assessing Paramount Pictures a total of $9,472.28.
Although the same policy was found governing the Exxon Valdez
operation, there were inconsistencies in its application. DoD did not
bill for overhead or for administrative costs in all cases.
Specifically, "...the Navy did not charge the required 3% for indirect
costs for its barracks ships". (Office of the Deputy Comptroller,
Management Systems, December 11, 1990)
Although these three cases demonstrate similarity in policy
with respect to the use of administrative surcharges, a difference in
policy was found regarding the requirement for asset use charges.
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Inconsistencies in the implementation of policy were also dis-
covered with respect to both types of charges.
E. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INCONSISTENCIES IN
COST REIMBURSEMENT POLICY FOLLOWED BY DOD
The author was unable to identify justifications, based on cost
accounting principles alone, for the differences in cost reimburse-
ment policies governing the three undertakings. However, it can be
argued that dissimilarities in the policies may exist due to the
varying degree of incentives in providing each of these services. For
example, the positive incentives involved with the production of a
movie such as Top Gun, which glamorizes the Navy and might serve
as a valuable public relations tool, could have had some influence
upon DoD in determining the costs to charge to the Paramount
Pictures Corporation. When asked to explain the possible justifi-
cation for the difference in the cost reimbursement policy accorded
to Paramount Pictures and the Exxon Corporation, the Special
Assistant (Audiovisual) from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs) responded: "We want the entertainment industry to
continue to make great pictures about us . . . Motion pictures, like
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Top Gun, are valuable means of recruitment, and help to improve
public perceptions of the military." (Strub, Feb 21, 1991)
A similar sentiment was expressed by the Director of the
Advertising Operations Division, Navy Recruiting Command
(COMNAVCRUITCOM), in a letter to the Washington representative of
the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers. The
Director states, "I am hopeful it [Top Gun] will generate much
positive visibility for Naval aviation, and will bolster Navy
recruiting efforts to both our target audience and to influentials."
(Sherwood, September 20, 1985)
Although these anticipated benefits may suggest an explanation
for the differences found in policies, the actual benefits generated
by such movies may not be as significant as perceived. At the
request of COMNAVCRUITCOM, a survey of 511 men, 18 years of age
and older, was conducted in July, 1987 by OmniTel, a weekly
telephone omnibus service. The survey was initiated after
COMNAVCRUITCOM detected, through a Navy Advertising Effectivness
Survey, a significant increase in Air Force advertising awareness
that could not be justified by Air Force advertising expenditures.
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The OmniTel survey, in part, asked "What branch of the U.S. military
is featured in the movie Top Gun?" In response, 28 percent of those
seeing the movie correctly identified the Navy as the branch
featured, 38 percent responded that the Air Force was featured, and
30 percent didn't know which branch of service was featured in the
picture. The target audience (18 to 24 year old males) showed more
favorable results, with 54 percent correctly identifying the Navy as
the military branch featured. In addition, in answer to the question,
"Which branch of the military had aircraft carriers?", 85 percent of
the respondents correctly identified the Navy, 10 percent responded
the Air Force, 1 percent the Army, and 4 percent didn't know which
branch of the military had aircraft carriers. (COMNAVCRUITCOM,
July, 1987)
A similar survey was conducted in May and June of 1990 to
evaluate the effects of the motion picture The Hunt for Red October.
According to COMNAVCRUITCOM, the survey showed that the movie
had a favorable effect on the public's perceptions of the Navy, as
well as on decisions to join. Of the 1,383 males contacted in the
survey, 211, or 13.8 percent, were members of the target audience
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(18-24 years old). Of these 211 males, 49 individuals, or 23 per-
cent, actually saw the movie. The survey showed that, of those 18
-24 year old respondents who had seen the movie, 27.4 percent now
had a more favorable opinion of the Navy, and 25.7 percent were now
more likely to recommend joining. (There may be some error, other
than rounding, in the COMNAVCRUITCOM percentages reported, since
27.4 percent of 49 is 13.426 respondents.) Results of the survey
also showed that 18.9 percent of the target audience responded that
they were now less likely to recommend joining the Navy. The Navy
Recruiting Command concluded that
The survey shows that movies such as The Hunt for Red
October enhance the Navy image and impact on the decisions
to join on a limited basis in the target market. Favorable
movies definitely help but not to the extent that some would
like to believe in this case. (COMNAVCRUITCOM, 6 June 1990)
The movie industry estimates that only 16 percent of the public
sees any one movie. In contrast, COMNAVCRUITCOM estimates that
76 percent of the target audience has recently heard or seen a Navy
advertisement. (COMNAVCRUITCOM, 6 June 1990)
In addition to the surveys completed by the Advertising
Department, the Navy Recruiting Command Research and Studies
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branch also conducted a study after the release of Top Gun, which
indicated no change, observable or measurable, in recruitment levels
(Kannapel, telephone conversation, May 21, 1991).
Although DoD (i.e., NAVINFO West and CHINFO) may have
anticipated some recruitment benefits from participation in the
production of the two motion pictures, these COMNAVCRUITCOM
studies and surveys do not strongly support the existence of
recruitment benefits.
Although recruitment benefits do not substantiate the dif-
ferent cost reimbursement policies accorded to each of the private
corporations, another possible justification was offered by the
Director of NAVINFO West. The Director stated that DoD policy did
not require production companies to make reimbursements for
military personnel expenses, in part because of the artistic control
that the military now has in the productions. In reviewing the 200
to 250 scripts received each year, NAVINFO West often makes
changes and revisions in order to achieve a more accurate portrayal
of military life. These revisions often result in the use of
additional military personnel in filming scenes and in gathering
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necessary technical advice. Therefore, at the time revisions were
being considered for the 1964 DODINST 5410.16, both NAVINFO West
and the Office of Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) felt that it
was inappropriate to bill production companies for military
personnel costs (Director, NAVINFO West, telephone conversation,
February 21, 1991). However, it can be argued that DoD could
maintain the same level of artistic control in the productions even
if such costs were included in the required reimbursements. The
demand for DoD assistance in commercial productions by the
entertainment industry may indeed decline with the inclusion of
such costs, but this may have little impact upon the number of
productions eventually receiving DoD assistance or the level of DoD
artistic control in each. The large number of script proposals
reviewed by NAVINFO West each year (200 to 250), in comparison to
the number of productions actually receiving assistance (One or
two), demonstrates a level of demand for services well above the
amount DoD has accorded to such undertakings in the past.
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F. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION IN DOD BILLING PROCEDURES
The one similarity that exists across each of these three cases
is the lack of standardization in implementing the established
billing policies. There are a number of sources of guidance and
detailed billing procedures covering those transactions in which the
Government purchases or contracts for services and material from
private organizations. These include the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR), the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR), and the Cost Accounting Standards
(CAS). (The DAR was incorporated as a supplement to the FAR in
1986 and was retitled DoD Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS)). However, these sources provide little
guidance, if any, for billing procedures to follow in those instances
in which the provider of services is now the government and the
recipient is a private, nondefense, enterprise. Other than the two
DoD instructions governing services provided in commercial
productions, DoD/Government accounting policies and procedures are
simply not designed to address these specific types of atypical
transactions. For example, the CFR stipulates that the FAR System
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"...is established for the codification and publication of uniform
policies and procedures for acquisitions by all executive
agencies. "(48 CFR 1.101). The CFR provides a similar description of
DAR, in that it establishes policies governing procurements by DoD
from industry, and not vice versa.
The March 1991 GAO report on the Exxon Valdez stated that
"Agencies could have used existing guidance in OMB Circulars and the
Cost Accounting Standards..." The report made several references to
instances where agencies were unaware of or failed to use the Cost
Accounting Standards in establishing billing procedures (GAO Draft
Report, March 1991). The GAO report refers to Cost Accounting
Standard 409, Depreciation of Tangible Capital Assets, when it
states that the "National Park Service erred in determining their
spill costs because NPS officials were not aware of the provisions
of this standard" (GAO Draft Report, March 1991, p. 55). There is,
however, no reason to believe that the CAS's were applicable to the
Exxon Valdez case, or to the two dealings with Paramount Pictures.
Section 719(g) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 mandates that
the CAS's Board establish "...cost accounting standards designed to
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achieve uniformity and consistency in the cost accounting principles
followed by defense contractors and subcontractors under Federal
contracts." Similarly, the CFR states that the Cost Accounting
Standards Board was established
...to implement the Defense Production Act of 1950, which
provides for development of Cost Accounting Standards to be
used in connection with negotiated national defense contracts
and for cost accounting standards to be used in such contracts
(4 CFR 331).
The CAS define national defense, as used in this context, as
"...any program for military or atomic energy production or
construction, military assistance to any foreign nations, stock-
piling, space, and directly related activity." (4 CFR 331.20(d)) This
definition and the described purpose of the CAS's do not seem to be
applicable to the three cases examined. In addition, Section 331.30
of 4 CFR describes categories of contracts and subcontracts which
are exempt from all CAS requirements. Among these are:
1
)
Contracts and subcontracts of $500,000 or less if business
unit is not currently performing any national defense CAS-
covered contracts.
2) Nondefense contracts and subcontracts awarded to business
units that are not currently performing any CAS-covered
national defense contracts.
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The author was unable to ascertain whether or not Paramount
Pictures or Exxon was concurrently involved in any CAS-covered
national defense contracts at the time of these three cases.
According to the CINCPACFLT Comptroller's Office, and from
examination of related documentation, CAS guidelines were not used
in deriving charges to assess Paramount Pictures for DoD services
rendered in the Top Gun or The Hunt for Red October productions. The
March 1991 GAO report implies that its authors considered the Exxon
Valdez oil spill cleanup operation subject to the CAS requirements.
The CFR provides billing guidance covering two types of
transaction in which DoD provides services or materials to a private
party. Part 251 of 32 CFR, entitled Sale of Government Furnished
Equipment or Material and Service to U.S. Companies, applies, in
large part, to those services and materials that are being supplied to
companies "...for final assembly or final manufacture into an end
item for use by the Military Services." (32 CFR 251.6) This does not
apply to those services provided by DoD in the three cases examined.
Part 863 of 32 CFR, entitled Leasing of USAF Aircraft and Related
Equipment to Nongovernment Organizations, outlines policies and
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procedures for leasing aircraft for such uses as international
airshows and foreign military sales. Procedures prescribe the use
of asset use charges, administrative surcharges, and flying hour
rates to recoup expenses for such items as depot maintenance and
base support.
Part 288 of 32 CFR, entitled User Charges, describes a policy
very similar to those found in DODINST 7230.7, OMB Circular A-25,
and NAVCOMPT Manual 035875(b), each also entitled User Charges.
All four guidances call for charges in order for the Government to
recover the full cost of rendering a service or the fair market value,
whichever is higher. Although not specifically required, each
proposes the use of charges to recover the full cost of military
personnel services, as well as charges for depreciation and interest
on investment.
G. SUMMARY
There is a variety of sources available which provide billing
guidance covering Government acquisitions of services and material
from private organizations. However, the same cannot be said for
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those situations in which the roles of seller and purchaser are
reversed. Although DoD instructions and Government regulations
provide some guidance, examination of the billing procedures used in
the three cases demonstrates a difference in policies concerning
reimbursement criteria. In addition, the variety of billing pro-
cedures used in implementing the different policies demonstrates
the need for standardization and further guidance to clarify the
specific steps to use in computing charges for DoD assistance
provided to private organizations. Differences in DoD policies and
the criteria for reimbursement of costs incurred do not appear to be
based on cost accounting principles. The differences appear to be
based on perceived recruitment benefits or loosely defined criteria
such as artistic control.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis presented an examination of the cost reimbursement
policies and billing procedures followed by DoD when providing
services to
1. The Paramount Pictures Corporation for the filming of the
motion pictures Top Gun and The Hunt for Red October and
2. The Exxon Corporation in support of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
cleanup operation.
The purpose of this examination was to determine what, if any,
dissimilarities existed in the reimbursement policies accorded to
each of these private corporations. This included an analysis of the
inconsistencies found in the implementation of the various polices.
Chapter I provided introductory and background information
concerning the policies and instructions which governed DoD assis-
tance provided to the two private parties. In addition, the chapter
described the thesis objectives and methods of research.
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Chapter II presented a detailed examination of the DoD cost
reimbursement policy governing the assistance provided to Para-
mount Pictures in the production of the motion picture Top Gun. This
included a review of the costs incurred and the billing procedures
followed by the U.S. Navy in providing this assistance.
Chapter III reviewed changes made in DoD policy, after the Top
Gun production, governing assistance in entertainment-oriented
commercial productions. This included an in depth examination of
the additional billing guidance provided and the changes in reim-
bursement criteria, which were implemented through revision of
DODINST 5410.16.
Chapter IV presented a detailed examination of the DoD billing
policy governing the assistance provided to Paramount Pictures in
the production of the motion picture The Hunt for Red October. This
included a review of the costs incurred and the billing procedures
followed by the U.S. Navy in providing this type of assistance.
Chapter V described the Federal Government's involvement in
the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation and the procedures
followed in determining the costs to assess the Exxon Corporation
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for assistance provided. This included an examination of the cost
reimbursement policies administered by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Chapter VI provided a comparison of the policies and billing
procedures followed in each of the three cases. This included an
examination of the dissimilarities in policy regarding the treatment
of charges assessed to each of these private parties, as well as the
inconsistencies found in policy implementation. Also discussed
were possible justifications for the differences in policy.
This chapter summarizes the conclusions drawn from the anal-
ysis, provides recommendations for possible improvements, and




The DoD billing policy and procedures mandated in
DODINST 5410.16 and 5410.15 are not consistent
with the reimbursement policy described in other
Federal Government regulations.
Of the DoD billing policies examined, the two DoD
instructions cited above are the only examples of policies which do
not call for charges to recover the full cost incurred in providing
assistance or the fair market value, whichever is higher. DoD
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instructions, governing assistance provided to an entertainment
oriented business, prohibit the Services from assessing charges for
services that would otherwise be billed if dealing with other types
of industry. Policies followed in the Top Gun production, prior to
revision of DODINST 5410.16, were more representative of the
Federal Government's general policy of recoupment of full cost, as
contrasted with the billing policy followed in The Hunt for Red
October production.
Differences in reimbursement criteria were also demon-
strated in the comparison of the billing policies governing services
provided to Paramount Pictures versus those policies governing
reimbursements for assistance provided to Exxon. Examples of
services billed to Exxon and not Paramount Pictures include the full
cost of military and civilian personnel and asset use charges. The
evidence reviewed for this thesis does not support the conclusion
that the differences in policy are justified by the perceived recruit-
ment benefits and artistic control of commercial productions.
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2. The lack of clarity in billing guidance and in the
criteria for reimbursements resulted in the use of
a variety of billing practices.
Although the revised DODINST 5410.16 provides additional
billing guidance and procedures when dealing with the entertainment
industry, DoD components involved in The Hunt for Red October
production continued to used a variety of billing procedures when
implementing established policy. Examples include
a. the variety of methods used in determining appropriate
charges for the tugboat services provided,
b. the use of a Special Deposit by the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard for services provided in The Hunt for Red
October production, even though a letter of credit had
already been established for the production, and
c. the variety of flight hour rates that exist among the
Services for the use of the same types of aircraft.
In the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation, the lack of clearly
defined billing procedures caused confusion and disagreement over
the reimbursement process. The use of a variety of billing
procedures contributed to agencies failing to recover the full costs
incurred.
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3. DoD Policy requirements for written agreements
were inconsistent
Policy provided in DoD instructions applicable to assistance
provided to the entertainment industry mandates the use of a
Reimbursement Agreement, Hold Harmless agreements, and a letter
of credit or advance payment. Similar agreements were not required
in the Exxon Valdez operation (other than the Hold Harmless
stipulation found in the LCM lease agreement). The lack of explicit
agreements prior to the provision of that assistance resulted in
reimbursement disagreements that otherwise might have been
avoided. Although the immediate action required in response to a
major oil spill prevents case by case preparation of written
agreements, regulations can be implemented which specify the
reporting, billing, and reimbursement procedures to be enacted when
such an incident does occurs. The Clean Water Act and the National
Contingency Plan provide a basic framework for the billing and
reimbursement process, but they do not provide the same level of
detailed instruction and recovery assurances as does the use of




1 . Standardization of billing policies.
DoD instructions governing reimbursement for services
provided to the entertainment industry should be revised in order to
be more consistent with the policies covering similar transactions
with other types of industries. These revisions should include
a. Reimbursement for the full cost of military and
civilian personnel costs incurred, similar to the procedures
followed during the Top Gun production and the Exxon Valdez oil
spill cleanup operation, and
b. The use of asset use charges to cover depreciation and
interest on investment in DoD owned fixed assets.
Similar billing policies should also be incorporated into the
Coast Guard regulations implementing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Along with clarifying what activities will be authorized and
reimbursed, the Coast Guard should establish clearly defined
methods for computing and recovering costs. The regulations should
include instructions for an asset use charge and administrative
surcharge, as well as a uniform procedure for recovering the full
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cost of military and personnel costs incurred (i.e., the use of
specific acceleration factors in order to remove billing incon-
sistencies among the Services).
Both Coast Guard regulations and DoD instructions should
also include adjustments for common costs such as the personnel
expenses incurred in normal operations which are not related to the
services being rendered to the private party (i.e., the salaries of
Electrician Mates and Engineermen, and costs incurred in conducting
coinciding military training exercises). Companies responsible for
pollution and private organizations in the entertainment industry
should be accorded the same billing considerations concerning flight
hours, ship operations, and personnel expenses. DoD billing policies
and Coast Guard regulations should be consistent in that both
require reimbursements for the full costs incurred in providing
assistance to private organizations. With respect to the Coast Guard
regulations implementing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, it is im-
portant that each of the federal agencies affected play an active
role in their development.
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2. Standardized flight hour rates
DoD should establish flight hour rates for military aircraft
similar to those already published in the NAVCOMPT Manual for
helicopters. This will eliminate the inconsistencies in cost reim-
bursements which exist among the Services and establish uniform
billings based on the nature of the recipient (i.e., DoD, Non-
DoD/other federal agency, and FMS/Non-Govemment).
D. SUBJECTS RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Several issues, which were beyond the scope of this thesis or
only briefly examined, warrant further research. These topics are
described below.
DoD was involved in a variety of motion picture and television
productions throughout the 1970's and 1980's, and this thesis pro-
vided an assessment of the billing practices followed in just two of
those productions. Examination of more recent dealings with the
entertainment industry may provide further insight into the question
of consistency in billing practices. Suggested areas of investigation
are the productions of Flight of the Intruder, Navy Seals, and the
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television series Supercarrier. Research could also focus on the
criteria used by DoD in selecting, from the 200 to 250 proposals
received each year, the one or two productions which actually
receive DoD assistance. Although some reference was made to USAF
regulations, this thesis focused mainly on the billing practices
followed by the Navy. An area for additional review may be a more
thorough examination of the policies established by the other Ser-
vices to recover costs incurred in providing this type of assistance.
Differences in billing procedures may or may not be discovered.
Some aspects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup operation
indicates that further research may be of value. Disagreements
continue over the reimbursement process used in the operation, with
federal agencies still seeking reimbursements for services not
authorized by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is in the process of
establishing regulations which implement the Oil Pollution Act of
1990. A suggested topic for research would be determination of
whether or not these new regulations are adequately designed to
avoid the confusion and disagreement over the reimbursement
process that occurred in the Exxon Valdez case.
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Finally, a suggested topic for research would be a comparison of
the billing practices followed in the more common transactions in
which the Government purchases services and/or material from
private organizations with those examined in this thesis. This could
include an application of the Cost Accounting Standards to the
billings discussed in this thesis in order to determine what impact
this would have on the charges assessed to the private corporations.
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Appendix A
HOURLY RATES FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE
Paramount Pictures DON Pays

























An explanation for the lack of a BAQ/TAD rate adjustment for
the Q-1 and Midshipmen pay grades could not be obtained.
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OF REIMBURSEMENT AGREEMENT
(To be composed on production company or studio letterhead)
1
.
Attached to this agreement is a lists of requirements for the production of "(title)"
that the Department of Defense has approved for its official support. This list also contains
estimates of the expenses that the U.S. Government expects to incur as a result of providing
assistance in support of each of these requirements. (Production company or studio) agrees to
reimburse the U.S. Government for all such expenses, and agrees further, in anticipation of
such reimbursement, to post (advanced payment or Letter of Credit) to (DoD organization
providing support or as appropriate) in the amount of (as applicable).
2. It is understood that DOD property, facilities, equipment and personnel will be made
available during the dates and times listed on the attached Detailed DOD Requirements List
unless unusual and unforeseen mission requirements prevent such assistance. Minor deviations
from the attached schedule may be necessary, but only as agreed to by mutual consent of
(production company or studio) and the DON installations and commands concerned.
3. The undersigned have read, understand, and agree to abide by DODINST 5410.16.
4. DoD Components agree to send (production company or studio) invoices via the
assigned project officer for the costs and the charges assessed as reimbursement to the U.S.
Government for the assistance provided in connection with "(title)" not later than (date). In
addition, if the aggregate of such costs and charges is less than the amount hereby posted, the
Department of Defense agrees to enclose a check with such invoice in an amount equal to








EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL & TO BE USED DATEATIME LOCATION DESCRIPTION OF ACTION DOD ESTIMATED
PERSONNEL REQUESTED IN SCENE COSTS
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